The importance of the North Waziristan operation

The Express Tribune

By Muhammad Ali Ehsan

Finally the much-awaited military operation against militants in the troubled North Waziristan Agency of Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Fata) has been launched. There was never any doubt that a ‘military operation’ was the only viable option and the only genuine solution available with the civilian government to root out terrorism. Why was then the operation being pended and delayed?

The political reason is too obvious as all politicians want to avoid any ‘scandalous activity’ that may cost them the votes that win them elections and keep them in power. It’s the military reason that has counted the most here and has really stood out. All military academies in the world teach ‘military commanders resolve’ as an outstanding military principle to achieve military successes. No doubt General (retd) Pervez Musharraf and General Kayani were top line generals of our army but they belonged to the same league. Together sharing the military leadership of Pakistan Army for 14 long years, they represented a military mindset that shared and believed in the ‘sacred doctrine of strategic depth’ that possibly was the reason that tied their hands behind their backs as the army continued fighting a ‘stalemated war’ that was being characterised more by ‘firefighting acts’ than any military actions of substance.

General Raheel Sharif, from the outset, vouched to respond to every terrorist act with a military action. Air strikes on the militant hideouts became a norm and it was generally being perceived that the new military commander was pushing his civilian bosses to agree to the initiation of a ‘military operation’ as the most-favoured option. All military commanders know that ‘the success of half of any military operation is reaching there, the other half is its execution’. If anything, the beginning of the military operation suggests that the army may also have reached a conclusion. It will no more guard and protect the ‘ideological frontier’ which it created and sustained and of which the Taliban were an essential part. A frontier, within which the Taliban once trained, nourished, housed and were even protected. If there ever is going to be a ‘responsible end’ to this war, it will come only if the army has finally decided that it no more recognises and accepts the notion of strategic depth and will meet all ‘ideological crusaders’ with a singular treatment.

Addressing the National Assembly, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has announced that the “the Zarb-e-Azb operation will not end till all terrorists are eliminated”. The people of Pakistan must own and rally around this mission statement given by the prime minister. Winning this war will not be easy. Nobody is even clear at this stage what really the definition of winning this war is. Surely it can’t only be the successful culmination of tactical operations in the battlefield zone. It has to be something more strategic. Something wider in scope — a single unanimous will of an entire nation, which should, in fact, act as a much ‘wider team’ to execute the prime minister’s given mission statement. In this dreadful irregular war that we fight across the length and breadth of the country, the complete nation will have to stand together to achieve this difficult but not impossible victory.

The real worry that the security establishment faces now is, how to counter the blowback and the retaliatory strikes by the Taliban in the country’s heartland? The Taliban spokesperson has already threatened and reminded the government that ‘our response will be tough’.

The war engulfs the entire country. Pakistan, today, is a war zone and the Taliban will fight this war where it will hurt the government and the army the most. Not in the mountains, gorges and deep valleys of North Waziristan. There these local and foreign militants will lie low or withdraw through the porous border into the neighbouring provinces in Afghanistan. It’s their vanguards who will retaliate — the likes of the group of terrorists that recently attacked the Karachi airport. These small groups of terrorists harbouring in the urban centres in the country are the real part of the Taliban’s response force. They have the capacity and the capability to create the nightmare that all custodians of safety and security of this country dread and fear. It is against these likely ‘violent and destructive’ militant actions in the urban centres by the death squads of the Taliban, that Pakistan is least prepared. The soft underbelly of Pakistan in the war on terror is its weak ‘second tier security apparatus’.

The example of Karachi — the port city and hub of Pakistan’s business and commercial activity — clearly illustrates why Pakistan’s mega cities may be the choice targets of Taliban’s ‘retaliatory strikes’. A city of over 25 million people, Karachi boosts a police force of only 35,000 men. Most of these men were recruited by the ruling parties on mutually agreed and shared quotas without meeting the required standards of recruitment. Highly unprofessional and corrupt, this is hardly a force that can be relied to put up a defense against the stealth techniques and sneaky and covert operations of the Taliban insurgents. As if their unprofessionalism was not enough — the police force that is highly politicised is mostly involved in serving and protecting the VIPs. According to a rough estimate, over 18,000 men are deployed to protect and serve only the city elite. No wonder the chief minister of Sindh deputed and tasked the military to guard the sensitive installations in the city. Except the odd IED attacks or small hit-and-run operations, I don’t see any likelihood of the Taliban raising their head in the operational area to meet the challenge that the Pakistan Army has thrown at them. Not under the lurking eyes of the ‘reconnaissance drones’ that the Pakistan Army now flies in the battlefield zone or the cobra helicopters that hover in the skies or even the fighter jets that will now target them day in and day out. The boots on ground will also be deeply relieved and now highly motivated as for them ‘the push has finally come to shove’. The army has enough troops on ground to clear and hold the nerve centres and vital tactical grounds in the operational area. Even if the Afghan Army does not shield its border and prevent the retreating ‘terrorists’ from infiltrating, the Pakistan Army will continue to flush out these terrorists towards the Afghan border.

The procrastination in the decision to launch a military operation by Pakistan’s military and civil elite gave Taliban tremendous military leverage. This all is about to change. The commencement of the military operation is no guarantor of ultimate success against the Taliban, but it surely is the most vital tool now being used by the state from its ‘options tool-kit’ to tip the balance in favour of the state.