IT is possible to read too much in the ebb and flow of the day-to-day developments and minutiae of the dialogue with the proscribed TTP. But, as both sides have constantly reiterated, the process is meant to be a quick one, so mini trends that manifest themselves are important. At the moment, with the government preparing for the next round of talks with the TTP leadership, the trend is unmistakable: the TTP is in the ascendant and the government is coming across as weak and uncertain. Consider the most recent developments. Yesterday Interior Minister Nisar Ali Khan announced in one of his habitual press conferences that more prisoners are to be released by the government. Quite who these prisoners are; what precisely they stand accused of, if anything; whether they are individuals whose release the TTP has specifically sought; indeed, how does it help the dialogue process if simultaneously trying to downplay the importance of the released and to-be-released individuals — none of those questions are being answered.
Meanwhile, the TTP has seemingly once again gained the upper hand in the negotiations process. As is now publicly known, the first prisoner releases by the government occurred in several phases over the last 10 days of March. Yet, the TTP publicly made a big show of debating internally whether to continue its ceasefire after April 1 and, when a decision to extend it for a mere 10 days was finally announced, the TTP cast its decision as a difficult choice and a huge sacrifice made in the face of stiff opposition from within many parts of the TTP network. So now, as the next round of talks approaches, the perceptions are clear: the TTP showing great forbearance and generosity of spirit; the government bending over backwards to make concessions to secure a deal.
Consider the change in tone and tenor, and results, from the two occasions in which the government did stand firm. First, when the government negotiating team insisted that any deal would have to be within the parameters of the Constitution, the TTP acquiesced by sidelining Abdul Aziz, the Lal Masjid cleric on the TTP negotiating committee who was opposed to the idea. Next, when the Mohmand chapter of the TTP killed 23 FC personnel they had held since 2010, the government came out and at long last demanded an unconditional ceasefire by the TTP. Once again, to the surprise of many, the TTP agreed — and militant violence significantly declined during the month-long ceasefire. The results speak for themselves. When the state stands firm and the government insists on certain minimal requirements for the dialogue to proceed, pressure on the TTP works. But when the TTP is allowed to grab the initiative and shape the dialogue process, it becomes bolder and more outrageous in its demands. Right now, it appears as if the TTP is calling the shots.
Sunday, April 6, 2014
Pakistan:TTP in the driving seat?
IT is possible to read too much in the ebb and flow of the day-to-day developments and minutiae of the dialogue with the proscribed TTP. But, as both sides have constantly reiterated, the process is meant to be a quick one, so mini trends that manifest themselves are important. At the moment, with the government preparing for the next round of talks with the TTP leadership, the trend is unmistakable: the TTP is in the ascendant and the government is coming across as weak and uncertain. Consider the most recent developments. Yesterday Interior Minister Nisar Ali Khan announced in one of his habitual press conferences that more prisoners are to be released by the government. Quite who these prisoners are; what precisely they stand accused of, if anything; whether they are individuals whose release the TTP has specifically sought; indeed, how does it help the dialogue process if simultaneously trying to downplay the importance of the released and to-be-released individuals — none of those questions are being answered.
Meanwhile, the TTP has seemingly once again gained the upper hand in the negotiations process. As is now publicly known, the first prisoner releases by the government occurred in several phases over the last 10 days of March. Yet, the TTP publicly made a big show of debating internally whether to continue its ceasefire after April 1 and, when a decision to extend it for a mere 10 days was finally announced, the TTP cast its decision as a difficult choice and a huge sacrifice made in the face of stiff opposition from within many parts of the TTP network. So now, as the next round of talks approaches, the perceptions are clear: the TTP showing great forbearance and generosity of spirit; the government bending over backwards to make concessions to secure a deal.
Consider the change in tone and tenor, and results, from the two occasions in which the government did stand firm. First, when the government negotiating team insisted that any deal would have to be within the parameters of the Constitution, the TTP acquiesced by sidelining Abdul Aziz, the Lal Masjid cleric on the TTP negotiating committee who was opposed to the idea. Next, when the Mohmand chapter of the TTP killed 23 FC personnel they had held since 2010, the government came out and at long last demanded an unconditional ceasefire by the TTP. Once again, to the surprise of many, the TTP agreed — and militant violence significantly declined during the month-long ceasefire. The results speak for themselves. When the state stands firm and the government insists on certain minimal requirements for the dialogue to proceed, pressure on the TTP works. But when the TTP is allowed to grab the initiative and shape the dialogue process, it becomes bolder and more outrageous in its demands. Right now, it appears as if the TTP is calling the shots.
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