A MEETING was held, decisions were taken, but no one seems inclined to tell Pakistan what was even talked about. All the country has been told is that a secret meeting place has been decided upon, among other decisions taken. Worryingly, the TTP-government dialogue has become a secretive process in which anything apparently can be decided – and the public is just supposed to accept those decisions, made in their name, as a fait accompli. To be sure, no negotiation process can progress much when there are constant leaks and both sides are rushing to make all their grievances and complaints public. But this is no ordinary negotiation process: the elected government of Pakistan is negotiating with a violent insurgent group with the explicit agenda of overthrowing the state and all the known demands of the outlawed TTP are in conflict with a constitutional, democratic polity where fundamental rights and the rule of law are meant to be paramount.
What the TTP leadership will demand when face to face with the government’s negotiating team can be guessed at. The release of prisoners and the acceptance of its domination over sections of North Waziristan will surely be at the top of that list. At the moment, it appears that the government wants to stretch out the dialogue process as long as possible to stave off the hard decisions while the TTP is amenable to an elongated talks process if it means a full-scale military operation is delayed. But that is not really a sustainable approach, at least for the government. Hard decisions will have to eventually be taken. And after shrouding the dialogue process in secrecy and mystery, the government may be tempted to make concessions that really ought to be unacceptable within the existing structure of state and society here. While the Taliban must necessarily be viewed with suspicion, neither should the government’s motives and intentions be automatically accepted as above the board.
There are two things the government ought to do before going behind closed doors for direct talks with the TTP leadership. First, the government must publicly and forthrightly reiterate that whatever is agreed upon – if an agreement is inched towards – will take place within the confines of the Constitution and the structure of the state as it presently exists. Second, the government must take the parliamentary leadership of the opposition parties into confidence too, and keep them abreast of any developments or breakthroughs in the talks process. Those steps would help ensure that the rulers are not secretly making unacceptable concessions and also keep the government in check.
Monday, March 24, 2014
Pakistan's Taliban Talks To Taliban: Editorial: The secrecy factor
A MEETING was held, decisions were taken, but no one seems inclined to tell Pakistan what was even talked about. All the country has been told is that a secret meeting place has been decided upon, among other decisions taken. Worryingly, the TTP-government dialogue has become a secretive process in which anything apparently can be decided – and the public is just supposed to accept those decisions, made in their name, as a fait accompli. To be sure, no negotiation process can progress much when there are constant leaks and both sides are rushing to make all their grievances and complaints public. But this is no ordinary negotiation process: the elected government of Pakistan is negotiating with a violent insurgent group with the explicit agenda of overthrowing the state and all the known demands of the outlawed TTP are in conflict with a constitutional, democratic polity where fundamental rights and the rule of law are meant to be paramount.
What the TTP leadership will demand when face to face with the government’s negotiating team can be guessed at. The release of prisoners and the acceptance of its domination over sections of North Waziristan will surely be at the top of that list. At the moment, it appears that the government wants to stretch out the dialogue process as long as possible to stave off the hard decisions while the TTP is amenable to an elongated talks process if it means a full-scale military operation is delayed. But that is not really a sustainable approach, at least for the government. Hard decisions will have to eventually be taken. And after shrouding the dialogue process in secrecy and mystery, the government may be tempted to make concessions that really ought to be unacceptable within the existing structure of state and society here. While the Taliban must necessarily be viewed with suspicion, neither should the government’s motives and intentions be automatically accepted as above the board.
There are two things the government ought to do before going behind closed doors for direct talks with the TTP leadership. First, the government must publicly and forthrightly reiterate that whatever is agreed upon – if an agreement is inched towards – will take place within the confines of the Constitution and the structure of the state as it presently exists. Second, the government must take the parliamentary leadership of the opposition parties into confidence too, and keep them abreast of any developments or breakthroughs in the talks process. Those steps would help ensure that the rulers are not secretly making unacceptable concessions and also keep the government in check.
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