ISLAMABAD, Peshawar and Quetta — all attacked after the outlawed TTP declared a ceasefire and all claimed by a so-called, previously unknown TTP splinter group, Ahrarul Hind. And still the government and the TTP are continuing with their dialogue-as-usual process. There are two separate sets of questions here, addressed to the PML-N government and the TTP. Start with the TTP. If a splinter group with national reach is implausible enough, the modus operandi of the Ahrarul Hind-claimed attacks has all the hallmarks of a TTP hit. Why then should the TTP’s claim that it has nothing to do with the attack be accepted without any proof? At the very least, given that even the TTP is not denying that the elements that constitute the Ahrarul Hind today were at some point a part of the TTP network, the militant group should be in a position to explain who this group is, how it operates and where its members are.
Given the murky world of militancy in which cross-pollination between various strands and tactical cooperation are known to take place regularly, it could well be that the Ahrarul Hind has linked up with the Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, for example, and is making use of the latter’s national reach. But even if that should prove to be the case, surely the TTP will have information that can help the state clamp down on this so-called splinter group bent on continuing with violence. A ceasefire can only prove meaningful if the TTP does all in its power to ensure that its present and former constituent units are abiding by its terms. If a group steps out of line and the TTP simply says that it remains committed to dialogue and upholding the ceasefire, that cannot be an acceptable state of affairs. The government has already seen that when it takes a firm line, the militant group does respond — as it does when it senses weakness on the government’s part.
For the government, the original and more fundamental questions about its peace-through-dialogue approach have returned again — and remain, as ever, unanswered. Ahrarul Hind, if it is a real and separate group with its own agenda, has sprouted into existence because of the state’s long-running tolerance for and accommodation of militant groups. From the very beginning, when the state first began to sponsor non-state actors, it was apparent that splinter groups and new branches — invariably more virulent and violent than the parent organisation — would proliferate. The problem, then, is not the splinter groups but the state’s willingness to treat militant groups as legitimate stakeholders. The PML-N’s dialogue mantra will ultimately be just a slightly more nuanced form of the policy of appeasement if it allows militancy to coexist with the state structure inside Pakistan. That hasn’t worked in the past and it won’t work now either.
Sunday, March 16, 2014
Pakistan: Meaningless ceasefire
ISLAMABAD, Peshawar and Quetta — all attacked after the outlawed TTP declared a ceasefire and all claimed by a so-called, previously unknown TTP splinter group, Ahrarul Hind. And still the government and the TTP are continuing with their dialogue-as-usual process. There are two separate sets of questions here, addressed to the PML-N government and the TTP. Start with the TTP. If a splinter group with national reach is implausible enough, the modus operandi of the Ahrarul Hind-claimed attacks has all the hallmarks of a TTP hit. Why then should the TTP’s claim that it has nothing to do with the attack be accepted without any proof? At the very least, given that even the TTP is not denying that the elements that constitute the Ahrarul Hind today were at some point a part of the TTP network, the militant group should be in a position to explain who this group is, how it operates and where its members are.
Given the murky world of militancy in which cross-pollination between various strands and tactical cooperation are known to take place regularly, it could well be that the Ahrarul Hind has linked up with the Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, for example, and is making use of the latter’s national reach. But even if that should prove to be the case, surely the TTP will have information that can help the state clamp down on this so-called splinter group bent on continuing with violence. A ceasefire can only prove meaningful if the TTP does all in its power to ensure that its present and former constituent units are abiding by its terms. If a group steps out of line and the TTP simply says that it remains committed to dialogue and upholding the ceasefire, that cannot be an acceptable state of affairs. The government has already seen that when it takes a firm line, the militant group does respond — as it does when it senses weakness on the government’s part.
For the government, the original and more fundamental questions about its peace-through-dialogue approach have returned again — and remain, as ever, unanswered. Ahrarul Hind, if it is a real and separate group with its own agenda, has sprouted into existence because of the state’s long-running tolerance for and accommodation of militant groups. From the very beginning, when the state first began to sponsor non-state actors, it was apparent that splinter groups and new branches — invariably more virulent and violent than the parent organisation — would proliferate. The problem, then, is not the splinter groups but the state’s willingness to treat militant groups as legitimate stakeholders. The PML-N’s dialogue mantra will ultimately be just a slightly more nuanced form of the policy of appeasement if it allows militancy to coexist with the state structure inside Pakistan. That hasn’t worked in the past and it won’t work now either.
No comments:
Post a Comment