WITH parts of Hangu and Tirah valley pummelled by the military, the inevitable speculation has picked up again: is this a soft roll out of the much-talked-about military operation against the TTP in North Waziristan? Thus far, there is little indication that that may be the case — though the intense speculation only adds to the pressure for one and also reinforces the notion of divisions between the PML-N government and the army high command on the best way ahead. For, as the weekend’s strikes by the military indicate, the idea of limited retaliation by the military after TTP attacks against it has already progressed towards so-called pre-emptive action. But even as the military goes from strictly defensive actions to a mildly aggressive posture, the government continues to insist that talks are still very much the preferred option — as long as the TTP wants to take up the government on its offer.
There are two elements here that merit comment: the army’s preparedness and the government’s negotiating strategy. On army preparedness, it is encouraging to note both the resolve to push back against the TTP militarily if necessary and a greater focus on targeted operations. However, military resolve and better intelligence are necessary but not sufficient conditions for military success — that would entail having a strategy that looks into both the medium- and long-term futures and ensuring that the civilian and military arms of the state can work together to deny militants space in their remaining strongholds. Whether there is any thought being given to such concerns by the army high command is unknown. What is clear though is that the military will need to redefine its understanding of success if a decision is eventually taken to allow the military option to go ahead.
As for the government’s negotiating strategy, at least this can be said for it: the craven and supine approach at the outset has gradually been replaced with a stronger and more convincing stance. Be it the insistence that talks must take place within the ambit of the Constitution or that any deal will be a localised affair to demand the TTP demonstrate its interest in a negotiated settlement by announcing a ceasefire first, the government — whether by design or because of the pressure it has found itself under — has finally put some genuine pressure on the TTP. If the government stands firm in the days ahead, it is the TTP that will have to provide answers first. Does the TTP have the ability to ensure militant violence ends across or the country? Is the TTP even genuinely interested in negotiations or is it just a time-buying tactic? If the government stands firm, the answers should be known shortly.
Monday, February 24, 2014
Pakistan: Military strikes
WITH parts of Hangu and Tirah valley pummelled by the military, the inevitable speculation has picked up again: is this a soft roll out of the much-talked-about military operation against the TTP in North Waziristan? Thus far, there is little indication that that may be the case — though the intense speculation only adds to the pressure for one and also reinforces the notion of divisions between the PML-N government and the army high command on the best way ahead. For, as the weekend’s strikes by the military indicate, the idea of limited retaliation by the military after TTP attacks against it has already progressed towards so-called pre-emptive action. But even as the military goes from strictly defensive actions to a mildly aggressive posture, the government continues to insist that talks are still very much the preferred option — as long as the TTP wants to take up the government on its offer.
There are two elements here that merit comment: the army’s preparedness and the government’s negotiating strategy. On army preparedness, it is encouraging to note both the resolve to push back against the TTP militarily if necessary and a greater focus on targeted operations. However, military resolve and better intelligence are necessary but not sufficient conditions for military success — that would entail having a strategy that looks into both the medium- and long-term futures and ensuring that the civilian and military arms of the state can work together to deny militants space in their remaining strongholds. Whether there is any thought being given to such concerns by the army high command is unknown. What is clear though is that the military will need to redefine its understanding of success if a decision is eventually taken to allow the military option to go ahead.
As for the government’s negotiating strategy, at least this can be said for it: the craven and supine approach at the outset has gradually been replaced with a stronger and more convincing stance. Be it the insistence that talks must take place within the ambit of the Constitution or that any deal will be a localised affair to demand the TTP demonstrate its interest in a negotiated settlement by announcing a ceasefire first, the government — whether by design or because of the pressure it has found itself under — has finally put some genuine pressure on the TTP. If the government stands firm in the days ahead, it is the TTP that will have to provide answers first. Does the TTP have the ability to ensure militant violence ends across or the country? Is the TTP even genuinely interested in negotiations or is it just a time-buying tactic? If the government stands firm, the answers should be known shortly.
No comments:
Post a Comment