Monday, October 21, 2013

Pakistan: Important questions: Talks with the US

THE stage is set this week for what is shaping up to be, by historical standards, a low-key meeting between a Pakistani prime minister and an American president. Prime Minister Sharif has made the obligatory statement about drones ahead of the visit, but has made it clear that he is not spoiling for a fight or a showdown. For its part, the Obama administration has indicated that monies owed to or aid meant to be delivered to Pakistan will be cleared in the months ahead – a boost to the federal government that is struggling on the fiscal front. In addition, a White House statement ahead of Prime Minister Sharif’s visit has given priority to economic issues rather than the more contested security ones. So all is well, then? The truth, as ever, is a fair bit more complicated than that. Economic issues are rightly being given importance but Pakistan’s problems are far deeper than any aid package or monetary assistance for military operations can help resolve. The Sharif government appears unwilling or unable to take the hard steps to structurally turn around the Pakistani economy, so what can an aid or trade partner — no matter how big — really achieve? On the security front, both sides appear to prefer to leave the principal issues left unsaid in public statement: a post-2014 Afghan settlement; the Sharif government’s bid for talks with the TTP; the internationalist jihadis in Fata and Pakistan proper; and non-violent extremism that creates an enabling environment for violent militancy. Mr Sharif has mentioned drones and his government’s desire to see drone strikes stopped, but that is a conversation unlikely to go very far. What, President Obama and his team will likely ask, is Pakistan doing about the very serious regional and international terrorist threat that lurks in Fata? And how exactly is Pakistan going to deal with the TTP threat, in the dialogue stage and later? Yet, that does not mean Pakistan does not have important questions of its own to ask. Is the White House any clearer about how to nudge the reconciliation process in Afghanistan forward? How will the highly disruptive and damaging cross-border movement — from both sides — along the Durand Line be managed as foreign forces pull out next year and then managed beyond that in 2014? On both sides then, the security-related questions that will likely be discussed aren’t just tough but also have no good answers. On the bright side, at least both sides are again talking to one another and not at each other.

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