By DECLAN WALSH
A weary familiarity hangs over the latest clashes between India and Pakistan, whose armies have traded artillery and accusations in recent days, jeopardizing new efforts to normalize relations between the two countries.
Still, though the escalation and excoriation may fit an old pattern, analysts believe something important has changed this time. The military exchanges have been more serious, and they point to a new brittleness in the rivalry: one that is being exacerbated by the impending American troop withdrawal in Afghanistan, analysts say.
It started in the disputed territory of Kashmir, with the deadliest episode of the past decade.
On Aug. 6, the Indian Army accused Pakistan of orchestrating a cross-border ambush in which five Indian soldiers were killed. Pakistan angrily rejected that claim, then accused India of killing two civilians during a bout of tit-for-tat cross-border shellfire.
Politicians issued heated warnings, the Parliaments in both countries passed condemnatory resolutions, and speculation grew that a meeting between the leaders of the two countries, set to take place at a United Nations summit meeting in New York next month, would be canceled.
The military exchanges continued on Friday. Each side claimed the other had fired first.
In some ways, this is nothing new. The two nuclear-armed countries have fought over the mountainous territory of Kashmir — which both claim in its entirety — since Pakistan was carved from British India in 1947. Border flare-ups have occurred many times before, and once tempers have calmed, diplomats on both sides resume the sputtering effort to normalize relations.
But the latest violence comes after an unrivaled stretch of eased tensions over Kashmir, mostly thanks to a 2003 cease-fire that has suited both sides. Pakistan’s military has been preoccupied with the war in Afghanistan and, more recently, the threat from Taliban insurgents in the northwest. India, meanwhile, learned the limits of armed confrontation after the last major standoff, in 2002, and has concentrated on building its economy.
But hard-liners in both countries remain firmly entrenched. And few doubt that the departure of American combat troops from Afghanistan by the end of 2014 will change the strategic calculus of circling hawks.
Some Indians fear that, as the Americans leave Afghanistan, Pakistan’s military will use the moment to draw international attention back onto Kashmir, either by bargaining with the United States or by diverting jihadi fighters to the territory, as it did for much of the 1990s.
“The Pakistanis will put up a price to assist with the transition in Afghanistan in 2014,” said Srinath Raghavan, a senior fellow at the Center for Policy Research in New Delhi. “Part of that price might be to mount pressure on India over Kashmir.”
Pakistani officials, worried about the possibility of a wider Afghan conflict spilling over their borders, retort that they cannot afford new hostilities with India. As for Islamist collusion, they say Pakistan is already under threat from Taliban fighters, who recently mounted a major jailbreak in the northwest of the country.
Moreover, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif had made a point of pledging to improve relations with India before he took office in June. He has a history of making overtures of peace to New Delhi, dating back to his last stint in power in the 1990s. He is under pressure from the business lobby in his native Punjab Province, which borders India, to bolster trade levels that, according to some estimates, could increase to $11 billion from $2 billion a year.
The question is whether Pakistan’s generals will permit Mr. Sharif to deliver on his promises. The security establishments of both countries have become “a mirror image of each other,” said Talat Masood, a retired Pakistani general who has participated in back-channel peace efforts. “Neither wants peace. Whenever any movement takes place, they create bottlenecks and problems.”
One ominous possibility, experts say, is that as American troops withdraw from Afghanistan next year, India and Pakistan will conduct their rivalry through proxy groups, a worry that was heightened by a suicide attack on an Indian consulate in eastern Afghanistan on Aug. 3.
“I think that Afghanistan will be a major theater for them,” said Stephen P. Cohen, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution.
For now, the most visible point of contention is in Kashmir. A top Indian general told reporters on Friday that India had killed 28 “terrorists” in the disputed territory since June 24, an unusually high number of casualties.
As usual, it was difficult to confirm that assertion. Both armies tightly limit access to the disputed border, known as the Line of Control. And it can be harder still to circle the logic behind the bloodshed.
After decades of strife, the cross-border exchanges of fire appear to have emotional rather than strategic value. Neither side realistically expects to gain ground, or to force the other to the negotiating table.
One problem is that governments on both sides are relatively weak right now. Mr. Sharif is struggling to calibrate his relationship with the powerful Pakistani military, while in New Delhi, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s Indian National Congress Party faces an election next year.
Another is that Pakistan has refused to bend to Indian demands to rein in Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, the leader of the jihadist group Lashkar-e-Taiba, and the country’s most prominent anti-India preacher.
In February, Mr. Saeed, who lives in open sight in Lahore despite a $10 million United States bounty for information leading to his capture, warned that “just as America had to run away, then India, you will leave Kashmir.” This week, he led prayers outside Qaddafi Stadium, one of Pakistan’s largest cricket grounds.
For the United States, increased hostility between Pakistan and India spells trouble, whether conducted in Kashmir or Afghanistan.
American officials helped de-escalate the last major border showdown, in 2002, when one million Indian soldiers massed on the Pakistani border. That confrontation, and one three years earlier in which President Bill Clinton intervened, brought global concern about the possibility of a nuclear exchange. While no one is saying such a disaster is imminent, the episodes are present reminders of the risks involved in any tension between India and Pakistan.
America’s other problem is its fragmented approach to the region. Even as the United States continues to pursue stronger economic ties with India, it depends on Pakistan to cooperate in Afghanistan and to crack down on militants sheltering in the northwestern tribal belt. Many analysts say that American attempts to walk that policy tightrope have often come across as incoherent.
Mr. Cohen, the author, said he feared the Pakistan-India conflict could stretch on for decades longer. One hope, he said, is that the troop reduction in Afghanistan in 2014 will give Washington a chance to formulate a more holistic regional approach.
“It’s like a kid who falls into a pile of manure and says, ‘Hey, there’s a pony around here somewhere,’ ” he said.
But, Mr. Cohen added, that is unlikely to happen. “I’m not confident we’re going to do that,” he said. “It’s going to be a case of cut and run.”
Saturday, August 17, 2013
U.S. Troop Pullout Affects India-Pakistan Rivalry
By DECLAN WALSH
A weary familiarity hangs over the latest clashes between India and Pakistan, whose armies have traded artillery and accusations in recent days, jeopardizing new efforts to normalize relations between the two countries.
Still, though the escalation and excoriation may fit an old pattern, analysts believe something important has changed this time. The military exchanges have been more serious, and they point to a new brittleness in the rivalry: one that is being exacerbated by the impending American troop withdrawal in Afghanistan, analysts say.
It started in the disputed territory of Kashmir, with the deadliest episode of the past decade.
On Aug. 6, the Indian Army accused Pakistan of orchestrating a cross-border ambush in which five Indian soldiers were killed. Pakistan angrily rejected that claim, then accused India of killing two civilians during a bout of tit-for-tat cross-border shellfire.
Politicians issued heated warnings, the Parliaments in both countries passed condemnatory resolutions, and speculation grew that a meeting between the leaders of the two countries, set to take place at a United Nations summit meeting in New York next month, would be canceled.
The military exchanges continued on Friday. Each side claimed the other had fired first.
In some ways, this is nothing new. The two nuclear-armed countries have fought over the mountainous territory of Kashmir — which both claim in its entirety — since Pakistan was carved from British India in 1947. Border flare-ups have occurred many times before, and once tempers have calmed, diplomats on both sides resume the sputtering effort to normalize relations.
But the latest violence comes after an unrivaled stretch of eased tensions over Kashmir, mostly thanks to a 2003 cease-fire that has suited both sides. Pakistan’s military has been preoccupied with the war in Afghanistan and, more recently, the threat from Taliban insurgents in the northwest. India, meanwhile, learned the limits of armed confrontation after the last major standoff, in 2002, and has concentrated on building its economy.
But hard-liners in both countries remain firmly entrenched. And few doubt that the departure of American combat troops from Afghanistan by the end of 2014 will change the strategic calculus of circling hawks.
Some Indians fear that, as the Americans leave Afghanistan, Pakistan’s military will use the moment to draw international attention back onto Kashmir, either by bargaining with the United States or by diverting jihadi fighters to the territory, as it did for much of the 1990s.
“The Pakistanis will put up a price to assist with the transition in Afghanistan in 2014,” said Srinath Raghavan, a senior fellow at the Center for Policy Research in New Delhi. “Part of that price might be to mount pressure on India over Kashmir.”
Pakistani officials, worried about the possibility of a wider Afghan conflict spilling over their borders, retort that they cannot afford new hostilities with India. As for Islamist collusion, they say Pakistan is already under threat from Taliban fighters, who recently mounted a major jailbreak in the northwest of the country.
Moreover, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif had made a point of pledging to improve relations with India before he took office in June. He has a history of making overtures of peace to New Delhi, dating back to his last stint in power in the 1990s. He is under pressure from the business lobby in his native Punjab Province, which borders India, to bolster trade levels that, according to some estimates, could increase to $11 billion from $2 billion a year.
The question is whether Pakistan’s generals will permit Mr. Sharif to deliver on his promises. The security establishments of both countries have become “a mirror image of each other,” said Talat Masood, a retired Pakistani general who has participated in back-channel peace efforts. “Neither wants peace. Whenever any movement takes place, they create bottlenecks and problems.”
One ominous possibility, experts say, is that as American troops withdraw from Afghanistan next year, India and Pakistan will conduct their rivalry through proxy groups, a worry that was heightened by a suicide attack on an Indian consulate in eastern Afghanistan on Aug. 3.
“I think that Afghanistan will be a major theater for them,” said Stephen P. Cohen, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution.
For now, the most visible point of contention is in Kashmir. A top Indian general told reporters on Friday that India had killed 28 “terrorists” in the disputed territory since June 24, an unusually high number of casualties.
As usual, it was difficult to confirm that assertion. Both armies tightly limit access to the disputed border, known as the Line of Control. And it can be harder still to circle the logic behind the bloodshed.
After decades of strife, the cross-border exchanges of fire appear to have emotional rather than strategic value. Neither side realistically expects to gain ground, or to force the other to the negotiating table.
One problem is that governments on both sides are relatively weak right now. Mr. Sharif is struggling to calibrate his relationship with the powerful Pakistani military, while in New Delhi, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s Indian National Congress Party faces an election next year.
Another is that Pakistan has refused to bend to Indian demands to rein in Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, the leader of the jihadist group Lashkar-e-Taiba, and the country’s most prominent anti-India preacher.
In February, Mr. Saeed, who lives in open sight in Lahore despite a $10 million United States bounty for information leading to his capture, warned that “just as America had to run away, then India, you will leave Kashmir.” This week, he led prayers outside Qaddafi Stadium, one of Pakistan’s largest cricket grounds.
For the United States, increased hostility between Pakistan and India spells trouble, whether conducted in Kashmir or Afghanistan.
American officials helped de-escalate the last major border showdown, in 2002, when one million Indian soldiers massed on the Pakistani border. That confrontation, and one three years earlier in which President Bill Clinton intervened, brought global concern about the possibility of a nuclear exchange. While no one is saying such a disaster is imminent, the episodes are present reminders of the risks involved in any tension between India and Pakistan.
America’s other problem is its fragmented approach to the region. Even as the United States continues to pursue stronger economic ties with India, it depends on Pakistan to cooperate in Afghanistan and to crack down on militants sheltering in the northwestern tribal belt. Many analysts say that American attempts to walk that policy tightrope have often come across as incoherent.
Mr. Cohen, the author, said he feared the Pakistan-India conflict could stretch on for decades longer. One hope, he said, is that the troop reduction in Afghanistan in 2014 will give Washington a chance to formulate a more holistic regional approach.
“It’s like a kid who falls into a pile of manure and says, ‘Hey, there’s a pony around here somewhere,’ ” he said.
But, Mr. Cohen added, that is unlikely to happen. “I’m not confident we’re going to do that,” he said. “It’s going to be a case of cut and run.”
No comments:
Post a Comment