IT’S become a near-daily feature of Pak-Afghan relations: one or the other side is blasting away at the other for all manner of sins, perceived and real. Now, it is the alleged faux pas by Sartaj Aziz, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s senior-most adviser on national security and foreign policy, that has riled the Afghans. Mr Aziz, according to Afghan officials, has suggested that Kabul accept some kind of power-sharing agreement with the Afghan Taliban, wherein, again according to Afghan officials, parts of the country may eventually be ceded to Taliban control. Predictably, Pakistan has denied any such suggestion was made but has not exactly gone out of its way to placate the irate Afghan officials, including President Hamid Karzai.
The tremendous difficulties associated with crafting a relatively stable and non-threatening Afghanistan post-2014 are well known. In truth, there are few good options when it comes to stabilising a country with virtually no history of stability or a central government and where the commitment of the international community to engineering long-term stability is certainly suspect. But within that framework of uncertainty, there are at least two things that Pakistan needs to correct when it comes to this country’s approach towards its long-troubled neighbour to the west. First, the Karzai-bashing has to stop — both because it is unseemly and because it is counterproductive. The army’s antipathy towards Mr Karzai appears to have trumped better sense in the army leadership, and the Foreign Office. Trying to so contemptuously sideline the Afghan president in the reconciliation process that Pakistan otherwise maintains should be Afghan-led and Afghan-owned is a bad idea. At the very least, Mr Karzai will be in office until April next year, and after the presidential election a Karzai could still be in office, or possibly a Karzai ally. Erratic, aggressive or plain contradictory as Mr Karzai may have become, the reality of the Afghan presidency as an important player — whether positive or as a spoiler — cannot be wished away. Pakistani policy as well as its posturing should reflect that reality.
Second, Pakistani policy towards Afghanistan and the articulation of that policy needs to reflect a humility that assuages old fears of this country’s true intentions. Using its undeniable, and un-denied, clout to nudge the Afghan Taliban to the negotiating table is one thing; rooting for an eventual takeover of Afghanistan, or just parts of that country, by the Taliban is quite another. Some clarity on that front would go a long way towards clearing the air.
Wednesday, July 3, 2013
Wrong approach: Pak-Afghan acrimony
IT’S become a near-daily feature of Pak-Afghan relations: one or the other side is blasting away at the other for all manner of sins, perceived and real. Now, it is the alleged faux pas by Sartaj Aziz, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s senior-most adviser on national security and foreign policy, that has riled the Afghans. Mr Aziz, according to Afghan officials, has suggested that Kabul accept some kind of power-sharing agreement with the Afghan Taliban, wherein, again according to Afghan officials, parts of the country may eventually be ceded to Taliban control. Predictably, Pakistan has denied any such suggestion was made but has not exactly gone out of its way to placate the irate Afghan officials, including President Hamid Karzai.
The tremendous difficulties associated with crafting a relatively stable and non-threatening Afghanistan post-2014 are well known. In truth, there are few good options when it comes to stabilising a country with virtually no history of stability or a central government and where the commitment of the international community to engineering long-term stability is certainly suspect. But within that framework of uncertainty, there are at least two things that Pakistan needs to correct when it comes to this country’s approach towards its long-troubled neighbour to the west. First, the Karzai-bashing has to stop — both because it is unseemly and because it is counterproductive. The army’s antipathy towards Mr Karzai appears to have trumped better sense in the army leadership, and the Foreign Office. Trying to so contemptuously sideline the Afghan president in the reconciliation process that Pakistan otherwise maintains should be Afghan-led and Afghan-owned is a bad idea. At the very least, Mr Karzai will be in office until April next year, and after the presidential election a Karzai could still be in office, or possibly a Karzai ally. Erratic, aggressive or plain contradictory as Mr Karzai may have become, the reality of the Afghan presidency as an important player — whether positive or as a spoiler — cannot be wished away. Pakistani policy as well as its posturing should reflect that reality.
Second, Pakistani policy towards Afghanistan and the articulation of that policy needs to reflect a humility that assuages old fears of this country’s true intentions. Using its undeniable, and un-denied, clout to nudge the Afghan Taliban to the negotiating table is one thing; rooting for an eventual takeover of Afghanistan, or just parts of that country, by the Taliban is quite another. Some clarity on that front would go a long way towards clearing the air.
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