Afghanistan’s reconciliation process

At this critical juncture when the US-led ISAF forces are planning to pull out of Afghanistan by 2014, bringing peace to the war-weary country has become more critical than ever. The Taliban insurgency is still very much a fact of life, threatening continuing conflict in post-withdrawal Afghanistan. A delegation of Afghanistan’s High Peace Council (AHPC) is in Pakistan to present a road map suggesting how Pakistan could help Afghanistan return to peace. Both countries have more than once agreed on a common strategy for ending the Afghan war through negotiations with the militants. Now that they are again sitting together to seek a solution through a mutually defined path, this is an encouraging development that howsoever late, if pursued with good and clean intentions, could yield positive results for both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Afghanistan’s economy is predicted to flounder once the international support dwindles after 2014. Any downturn in the already precariously placed economy could plunge the country into deeper chaos, including an all out civil war. This development could affect Pakistan as well because of the spillover effect. The AHPC, led by Chairman Salahuddin Rabbani, son of the slain former head of the AHPC Professor Rabbani, has been invited to Pakistan by Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar to deliberate on the options for pushing the reconciliation process forward in Afghanistan. Pakistan is accused of having close links with the Taliban, especially their allied Haqqani network that has been instrumental in reversing the efforts of the international forces to stabilise Afghanistan. The safe haven of the Haqqanis in North Waziristan has been the catalyst for drone strikes in the area. In spite of the intelligence available on the presence of the Haqqanis in Pakistan and the latter’s support to the Taliban generally, the policy of denial adopted by Islamabad to delink itself from the two factions increasingly looks like it will end up harming Pakistan more than perhaps even Afghanistan. For example, Pakistan’s denial of the existence of a Quetta Shura, and therefore its inability to meet the request of the AHPC delegation for access to it and Mulla Omar would reduce the ‘show’ of adherence to reconciliation in Afghanistan to a farce. Further, Pakistan could end up with international sanctions being extended against it since the Haqqani network has now been declared a terrorist organisation by both the US and the UN. Collusion with, or support to the outfit now invites the possibility of international sanctions as a terrorist-harbouring state. The repatriation to Afghanistan of Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the Taliban’s former second-in-command, in detention in Pakistan, has also been requested by the AHPC since his presence in Afghanistan is seen an effective conduit for negotiations with the Taliban leaders. If, instead of blatant denials and prevarication, both these requests are met, this could constitute a giant step forward towards kick-starting a peace process in Afghanistan. After the US’s halting, now on, now off efforts to reach out to the Taliban floundered, not the least because of Washington’s foot dragging over the release of Taliban prisoners from Guantanamo Bay, it became obvious that a unilateral US channel for negotiations would not be allowed to succeed by the ISI either, the latter fearing being left out in the cold in any eventual settlement. Pakistan’s involvement therefore is once again centre-stage in the attempts to normalise the situation in Afghanistan. The Taliban’s past reservations about talking to the ‘puppet’ Karzai government may yield to the new ground realities post-withdrawal. Kabul has been open to the setting up of a truly representative government that includes the Taliban, provided they lay down their arms and accept the post-2001 system in place. This is unlikely to come about with clearly demarcated phases of disarmament and political participation. More likely, and basing oneself on peace processes in other conflict situations, it will be a mixed bag of advances and retreats, with many a blip along the way. The only guarantee that the peace and reconciliation process might finally succeed is if both sides are sincere, open, and committed to the historic compromises that may be required. Also they must be prepared to persist in the face of any sabotage attempts by spoilers. Pakistan has to make a choice whether to become part of the solution by facilitating the negotiating process or remain part of the problem by persisting with support to Afghan jihadi extremists, at peril to Afghanistan, Pakistan itself, as well as the region and the larger world.