Making sense of US-Pakistan ties

Gulfnews.com

Political and military leaders have narrowed their differences and favour a hard-headed pragmatic re-setting of relations By Tanvir Ahmad Khan, Special to Gulf News Pakistan’s relations with the United States are not only important for the country but also for the entire region. Even as it waxes and wanes, the relationship has been a major determinant of the regional history since the Soviet Union’s fateful invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The Pakistani and American re-engagement in 2001 paved the way for the decade-long US-led Nato-International Security Force’s (Isaf) military intervention in Afghanistan that brought down the Taliban and launched the so-called global war on terrorism. And yet, defining bilateral relations has become a highly contested exercise in the midst of glaring contradictions. In Pakistan, it is no longer clear as to which forum would ‘re-set’ the relationship undermined by various American actions that outraged public opinion and forced the government to block overland transit of supplies for Nato-Isaf forces. President Asif Ali Zardari’s elected government is as, if not more, ‘pro-American’ as that of General Pervez Musharraf and yet it now evades direct executive decisions and declares that future relations with the United States would be decided by parliament. On its part, parliament has before it, since March 20, a report written by the Parliamentary Committee on National Security on Guidelines for Revised Terms of Engagement with USA/Nato/Isaf (PCNS). The report not only seeks to provide a framework for future cooperation with the US but also makes recommendations for strengthening relations with some other states including China, Russia and Iran with a view to re-balancing Pakistan’s foreign policy. A conspicuous lack of consensus in the joint session of the two houses of parliament convened to consider it has led to procrastination and there has been no substantive parliamentary debate so far. An extraordinary meeting of various political and military leaders has now tried to identify ideas that would break the logjam in parliament. Following this conference in which the opposition parties reportedly took a hard line with an eye on the next general election — anti-Americanism gets votes — the Committee has gone back to the drawing board to reconsider some of the initial recommendations; the result may be a tightening of conditionalities under which full scale collaboration with foreign forces could be resumed.Populism apart, the opposition, especially from the right wing, is being driven by two factors: one, scepticism about government motives in referring Pakistan-US relations to parliament and, two, suspicion that recent high level meetings between the two countries — Prime Minister Yousuf Gilani’s consultations with President Barack Obama in Seoul and Pakistan army chief, General Pervez Kayani’s long deliberations with Centcom’s leader, General James Mattis and Isaf commander, General John Allen in Islamabad — were an attempt to settle issues at the executive level while using parliament for political legitimacy. Then there is the pressure of media leaks from Washington that it would turn to India and the northern route states — Russia and Central Asia — if Pakistan fails to deliver. The tipping point will be parliament making cessation of lethal drone attacks a precondition to restoration of overland transit routes. Government leaders in Islamabad deflect criticism with rhetorical declarations that the president and prime minister have effectively transferred their powers to parliament. In reality, Pakistan’s governance continues to be a personality-centred affair with a very narrow base of authority. Pakistani parliaments have seldom taken a proactive interest in the formulation and conduct of external relations; they have, as a rule, lacked information, expertise and the resolve to address highly complex issues of international relations. Matters concerning the US have particularly been settled in secret civil and military conclaves; the process reaching a climax with Musharraf concluding secret agreements that parliament is now belatedly demanding to see. There is much clamour that the armed forces and the allied foreign policy establishment do not allow the elected institutions to play a significant role in the realm of foreign and security policy. The executive has probably gone to parliament not because of a revolutionary re-think but because collaboration with the US has become extremely unpopular after certain events. Prominent among them are the following: departure with impunity of the CIA killer of two Pakistani citizens in Lahore; the unprovoked destruction by Nato aircraft of the Pakistani border post, Salala, in which 24 Pakistani soldiers perished; information that transit rights given to foreign forces in Afghanistan have depreciated Pakistan’s infrastructure to the tune of Rs80 billion and above all, speculative reports that Zardari’s government has facilitated an influx of “thousands” of American intelligence operatives and special forces personnel into Pakistan. As things stand today, political and military leaders seem to have narrowed their differences vis-a-vis Washington and favour a hard-headed pragmatic re-setting of cooperative relations. Parliament is expected to give it a broad ownership but, anticipating early elections, politicians wish to act as custodians of Pakistan’s sovereignty. The government has not been able to control parliament’s proceedings and foreign policy has got caught up in the cross-currents of Pakistani politics. It is yet to be seen how the civil and military leaders re-engage with the US without a prohibitive cost for the political class.