#Pakistan - The cost of surrender

 

THE terms of surrender may not have been made public but the capitulation could not have been more humiliating. There was nothing surprising about the government succumbing to a lawless brigade. The writ of the state has yet again crumbled in the face of violent extremism. After two weeks of blowing hot and cold, the PTI government has apparently signed on the dotted line. It is the seventh time in the past five years that the Tehreek-i-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) has brought the state to its knees. Each time it has returned more empowered.

The group that does not have any representation in the national parliament and has been proscribed as a terrorist outfit seeks to determine the country’s political and ideological course. The little-known Barelvi militant outfit saw its rise after its first siege of the capital in 2017. It was the civil-military divide, and not its popular mass support, that turned it into a force to be reckoned with.

A few thousand zealots led by a foul-mouthed cleric virtually paralysed Islamabad for more than three weeks. A troubled civilian administration was rendered helpless because of the alleged support of the intelligence agencies for the mob. Justice Qazi Isa’s damning ruling in the 2017 sit-in case sheds some light on the role of the intelligence agencies and some political leaders in encouraging the mob in order to weaken the then federal government. An oversight in a bill passed by parliament was used to whip up religious sentiments.

A besieged PML-N government was forced to accept the demands of the protesters that also included the resignation of the then federal law minister. The engineered anti-government protest empo­wered the radical Barelvi clerics. The siege of Islam­abad also saw the rise of the TLP as a major religio-political force. It galvanised Barelvi militancy.

The oft-repeated mantra of ‘establishing the writ of the state’ has become a joke.


Curiously, the sectarian outfit that preached violence in the name of faith was allowed to participate in the 2018 elections. Although it didn’t win any National Assembly seat it emerged as the fourth largest bloc in Punjab in terms of the share of votes. Political machinations legitimised a militant sectarian group that hailed Mumtaz Qadri, the murderer of Salmaan Taseer who was the governor of Punjab.
The TLP’s main support comes from the urban and rural lower-middle classes and traders. It has also made inroads into the support base of other established Islamic parties which have been virtually wiped out in Punjab. The frequent agitations are seen as a way of keeping the TLP politically alive and maintaining its financial lifeline. It would shake the government into submission each time it marched into Islamabad, further emboldening its supporters. The 2020 agreement signed by the PTI government was perhaps the most shameful. But it didn’t stop the group from launching another protest march a few months later. In panic, the PTI government declared the TLP a terrorist outfit early this year and arrested its leaders under the anti-terrorism laws. But days later, it started backing down, stalling the process required under the Constitution to provide a legal cover to the ban. The group continued its activities with impunity. The administration seems to have deliberately kept its proscription decision ambiguous. It has continued with its appeasement approach despite the TLP’s violent activities.
Many in the PTI, including the prime minister, would assure the group that there was no difference between their and the TLP’s allegiance to the faith. The PTI’s increasing emphasis on religiosity, however, doesn’t seem to have appeased the radical clerics. What happened over the last two weeks was predictable. The banned outfit was once again out on the streets choking GT Road and threatening to storm Islamabad.
The TLP has once again made the country hostage, attacking the civilian law-enforcement agencies. The confusion was manifested in the contradictory statements emanating from federal ministers. The widening gap between the civil and military leadership may have also been a reason for the policy disarray. The administration appeared completely helpless against a few thousand zealots blocking the highways. The oft-repeated mantra of ‘establishing the writ of the state’ became a joke with the zealots paralysing the administration. While the federal government was bending over backwards pleading with the banned terrorist group for negotiations the violence continued unabated, leaving several policemen dead. The writ of the state was nowhere to be seen.
One must appreciate the opposition parties for not jumping into the fray and exploiting the situation in order to put the government under more pressure by siding with the TLP. This sane approach was markedly different from the PTI’s opportunistic politics during the 2017 siege of Islamabad. How can one forget Imran Khan’s speeches at that time whipping up religious sentiments?
There was hardly any difference between the TLP’s and PTI’s position on the demand for the law minister’s resignation. Now the PTI government faces the same extremist challenge which it seems incapable of dealing with. Its capitulation was very much predictable. Its latest agreement with the TLP has worsened the internal security situation arising from increasing faith-based extremism. Apparently, the government has agreed not to pursue criminal cases against TLP activists allegedly involved in the killing of policemen and destroying state and public properties. It also appears that the government will not pursue the legal process in its decision to proscribe the group. The deal came through after the prime minister’s meeting with a group of clerics most of whom are considered ideologically close to the TLP.
On their insistence, the prime minister also chan­ged the government’s negotiating team and included those ministers who are believed to have strong conservative views and considered sympathetic to the TLP’s retrogressive sectarian ideology. While the government claims that the crisis is over, the TLP has yet to call off the agitation saying it would wait for the government to implement the agreement.
The deal has legitimised a banned terrorist group. The crisis is far from over. Emboldened by their latest triumph, the radical clerics will soon be back with new demands. The country remains hostage to a terrorist band threatening to tear apart national security.
https://www.dawn.com/news/1655672/the-cost-of-surrender

#Pakistan - Editorial: The govt's duplicitous approach in dealing with the TLP and the PTM is shocking

 WHEN it comes to individuals the state deems a nuisance, the double-dealing is shocking. Take the case of the Tehreek-i-Labbaik Pakistan activists, who paralyze major roads, allegedly kill policemen, destroy public property and use choice words to hit out at the civil, military, and judicial leadership.

Though the TLP has been banned, branded anti-state, and accused of terrorism, even of links with RAW, the reverential tone and sentiment of forgiveness the government has adopted when dealing with them these days is in sharp contrast to the treatment meted out to others the state sees as anti-national.

 The indictment this week in Karachi of MNA Ali Wazir by an anti-terrorism court — on the basis of a questionable case prepared by the police — is an example. Time and again, both the federal and provincial governments have shown they have little patience with Mr Wazir and others representing the Pashtun Tahaffuz Movement. Though restraint, middle paths and solutions have been painstakingly sought for the TLP, when it comes to the PTM, astoundingly it appears there is a no-tolerance policy.

Ali Wazir has been indicted for sedition, the go-to charge for those who question, criticise and challenge certain power quarters. Mr Wazir was detained in Peshawar in 2020 on the orders of the Sindh Police for an allegedly anti-state speech made in Karachi, and has remained in custody without bail. He, along with 10 others, have denied the charges. It is appalling enough that an MNA should have been repeatedly denied bail, but it is even more shameful that the lawmaker is being tried in an anti-terrorism court.

 The Sindh government’s role in this is unacceptable and mirrors the approach taken by the KP government when it arrested PTM chief Manzoor Pashteen, as well as the federal government that has in the past arrested PTM supporters. As far as our rulers are concerned, the movement falls into the category of those anti-state groups our rulers do not negotiate, engage or make deals with but instead, hound, arrest and punish.

https://www.dawn.com/news/1656085/duplicitous-approach


Why Saudi Arabia decided to bail out bankrupt Pakistan despite its Iranian tilt

Christine Fair While Saudi Arabia has no interest in limiting ties with India at Pakistan’s behest, it does want to limit the temptation for Pakistan to reassert ties with Iran.

On 31 October, Pakistan’s troubled prime minister expressed his gratitude to Saudi Arabia for its recent commitment “to deposit $3 billion and financing $1.2 billion refined petroleum products during the year”, and further opined that the two states enjoy “long-standing and historic fraternal relations, rooted deep in common faith, shared history and mutual support”. Khan further effused that the move “reaffirms the all-weather friendship between the two states”. However, this verbiage is a small fig leaf for the bigger truth: There has long-been trouble in paradise for the two states. Why has Riyadh sought to begin closing the otherwise gaping chasm in relations now? Afghanistan likely explains the move in some measure, but Riyadh's growing economic ties with India will constrain the limits of Saudi-Pakistan ties.

Paradise lost?

Pakistan and Saudi Arabia’s ties predate the latter’s acquisition of massive wealth. In the 1960s, both sides valued each other for reciprocal reasons. Saudi appreciated Pakistan’s willingness to train Saudi armed forces as a countermeasure to Gamal Abdel Nasser’s socialist regime in Egypt. The kingdom sent troops to Pakistan for training and later, following an agreement in the mid-1960s, retired Pakistani military officials went to Saudi Arabia both to help build up the kingdom’s armed forces while enabling Pakistan to forge an international presence in the wake of its defeats to India in 1965 and 1971. Saudi Arabia became even closer to Pakistan after the loss of East Pakistan.

Events in the late 1970s bolstered Saudi’s interest in strengthening its security with the military help from the Land of the Pure, including the dissidents’ 1979 siege of the mosque at Mecca, the Iranian Revolution, the Iran-Iraq War and the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan. By 1981, the Pakistan government admitted that “1,500 to 2,000 military men are on duty in Saudi Arabia in what they describe as engineering and training assignments”. In return, Saudi Arabia paid Pakistan perhaps as much as $1 billion. Throughout this period, Western intelligence agencies were aware of Pakistan’s efforts to build a nuclear bomb. Throughout the 1980s, Pakistan became the beneficiary of Saudi largesse while Saudi Arabia benefited from Pakistan’s military assets.

As Pakistan’s economic situation became ever more shambolic, its reliance upon Saudi Arabia deepened. Saudi Arabia was more than happy to oblige: It deferred loan payments for subsidised Pakistani oil imports; helped build large networks of madrassas, dampened impacts of sanctions following Pakistan’s 1998 nuclear tests in exchange for Pakistan military assistance while shoring up its regional interests. Moreover, remittances from Pakistani migrant workers in Saudi Arabia comprise about one-fourth of Pakistan’s overall foreign remittances while providing the kingdom with much-needed human resources.

Given the inordinate financial dependence upon Saudi Arabia and Riyadh’s expectation that Pakistan would be a reliable military partner, Saudi Arabia was miffed when Pakistan demurred from contributing ships, aircraft, and troops to Saudi’s brutal campaign in Yemen to restore President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi in April 2015 after Pakistan’s parliament voted to remain neutral. Despite then prime minister Nawaz Sharif’s close ties with Saudi Arabia, Sharif’s opposition to Pakistan’s military made his government unreliable in the eyes of Riyadh. In an effort to smooth over Riyadh’s ruffled feathers, Pakistan participated in the 2016 “North Thunder” military exercise with Saudi Arabia and its allies as well as joint exercises between the special forces of both countries.

The Sharif government additionally dispatched more than 1,000 troops to the Kingdom, which augmented the 1,600 already deployed to Saudi Arabia to “secure Islamic holy sites and serve in other internal security roles”. In November 2017, Sharif’s government joined the Saudi-led Islamic Military Counter-Terrorism Coalition, which is comprised militaries from 41 Islamic countries ostensibly to fight terrorist groups and their activities throughout the Muslim world. Pakistan’s retired Army chief Raheel Sharif commanded the group.

In August 2018, the Pakistan Army selected Imran Khan as the prime minister, which suggested a greater degree of alignment between Rawalpindi and Islamabad. For a brief period, Prime Minister Khan and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman enjoyed bonhomie. As Khan came into office, Pakistan’s military had secured an economic package from Riyadh and the crown prince personally invited Khan to come to the Kingdom to attend a conference on investments. Other high-profile invitees withdrew following the 2018 murder of Jamal Khashoggi, a dissident Saudi journalist residing in the United States. Within a month of the conference, the first $1 billion of a $3 billion loan was delivered to Pakistan.

Riyadh’s junior partner in the region, Abu Dhabi, followed through with a comparable offering. As if to reward a pliant client, in February 2019, Mohammad bin Salman arrived in Islamabad with an entourage of businessmen with pages in over $20 billion, including an Aramco oil refinery in Gwadar. In March 2019, Pakistan’s willingness to join a Saudi-led coalition against Iran appeared to have patched up any lingering concern about Pakistan’s commitment to the Kindom.

A short-lived respite

In August 2019, India dispensed with Kashmir’s special status. Pakistan was incensed and was discomfited when Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates kept mum on the matter and remained so. In contrast, Turkey and Malaysia lent their outcry to that of Pakistan. The three countries considered forming an alternate Islamic bloc given Arab insouciance about India’s bold move.

Malaysia put a December summit on the books. Malaysia’s prime minister intimated that it would serve as an alternative bloc “to the inert, Saudi-dominated Organisation of Islamic Cooperation.” Ultimately, under vituperative Saudi threats, Pakistan withdrew from the Kuala Lumpur summit, which was attended by Saudi’s regional rivals Qatar, Turkey and Iran.

On the one-year anniversary of India’s decision to strip Kashmir of its special status, and after accumulating frustration with Saudi inaction over the outrage, Pakistan’s foreign minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi demanded that Saudi Arabia show leadership on the matter and convene a special meeting of the OIC to inveigh upon the matter. Failing to do so, Qureshi threatened to turn to Malaysia, Turkey and Iran which had vocally sided with Pakistan.

Riyadh was not amused. It demanded that Pakistan immediately repay $1 billion, which was part of the $3 billion lent to Pakistan in November 2018. While China stepped in to bail out Pakistan, but the question lingered: What leverage does aid-dependent Pakistan have over its long-standing benefactor?

The long haul?

So what happened? Economics happened. The fact of the matter is that even Saudi Arabia has seen the long-term writing on the wall. In 2019-20, bilateral trade between India and Saudi Arabia was valued at more than $44 billion while trade with Pakistan was a meager $3.6 billion.

Under Mohammad bin Salman, Saudi Arabia cares about cash not concord across the Muslim world. To underscore this point, Mohammad bin Salman endorsed China’s policies in Xinjiang, which other states have decried as a genocide. China is Saudi Arabia’s largest trading partner.

However, Saudi Arabia has been shut out of the most important developments in the region: The Taliban victory in Afghanistan, due to Pakistan’s unstinting military, diplomatic and political support. In 2013, the Taliban opened its first overseas office in Doha. Since then, Doha and China — along with Pakistan, Turkey, and the United States — have shaped the events in Afghanistan without any substantive role for Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia wants to reassert its prominence in the region after being eclipsed by its regional rivals for several years. While Saudi Arabia has no interest in limiting ties with India at Pakistan’s behest, it does want to limit the temptation for Pakistan to reassert ties with Iran. Pakistan’s partnership with Beijing, based nearly entirely on loans, cannot replace the Kingdom’s heft in the Islamic world even if it can influence it with the allure of its economy. While Pakistan won’t get Saudi’s support on Kashmir, it is perfectly happy to cash Riyadh’s check. And that’s enough for both.

https://www.firstpost.com/world/why-saudi-arabia-decided-to-bail-out-bankrupt-pakistan-despite-its-iranian-tilt-10111951.html