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Understanding The Origins Of Pan-Islamism During World War I – Analysis

By Wolfgang G. Schwanitz

The German-Ottoman jihadization of Islam during World War I led to the development of the first Sunni theory of Islamism. It called for Islamic lands to run their regions under one global brotherhood and to fight enemies according to Islamic rules. Abd al-Malik Hamza Bey developed the theory during World War I; he favored an interfaith coalition with “friendly states” (the Central Powers) against “enemy states” (the Allied Powers of England, France, and Russia). Once glorious lands would seek peace when the colonialists left, assured Hamza, who justified an anticolonial jihad. Since his theory led Islamists into global struggles, it is important to analyze the text that he printed with his co-editor Abd al-Aziz Jawish.

Before the Great War, Hamza worked as a secretary of Egypt’s National Party, which Mustafa Kamil had built in 1907. In the 1905 Morocco crisis, as France wanted to dominate this not-yet colonized North African country, Kamil wrote an article in Berliner Tageblatt on “Kaiser Wilhelm and Islam.” He lauded him for his 1898 visit to Sultan-Caliph Abdülhamid II, who was shunned for prior Armenian massacres. In 1917, the Kaiser made a follow-up visit to the caliph’s successor Mehmed V and Istanbul’s Shaik of Islam Musa Kazim. Wilhelm acted as “protector of 300 million Muslims,” stressed Kamil. He touted Wilhelm’s speech in Morocco for defending that land’s integrity. On a horse given to him by Sultan Abd al-Aziz in Tangier, the Kaiser even proclaimed to protect Morocco’s independence and favored an “open door policy.” Paris was shocked, while Morocco and Egypt were enthused. Thus, Kamil suggested a joint action by Paris and Berlin against London to also secure the Nile state’s independence, since 1882 a de facto and 1914 a real British protectorate.

After Kamil’s death in 1908, Muhammad Farid took the helm to see the British leave Egypt. Both had advanced an enlightened nationalism, proudly tied to 3,500 years of Pharaonic civilization, where Islam was the cornerstone since 642. The nationalists were inspired, too, by French republican values of liberty, equality, and fraternity. To reach their goal, the Egyptians tried to game the Great Powers. After the Egyptians pitted the French against the British and Russians, the Germans offered more support in the second Morocco crisis of 1911 as the Kaiser ordered a German gunboat to Agadir as an answer to more French troop deployments there. This ended in a typical deal as France took over Morocco as a protectorate and made territorial concessions to Berlin in French Congo. Meanwhile, Hamza adopted some of Farid’s ideas after the latter took a trip to Germany. But global views carried local conflicts: European ideas collided with Islamic life and shed light on the minorities’ position.

German Lobbies

Hamza wanted to bring Berlin into the fold against the Allied Powers on the path to modernity, or as Farid put it: Colonial Powers do not wish other peoples ascending who in turn do not desire foreign masters. In this anti-imperial fight, the non-colonial German offer was attractive: We provide you with means, and you keep your empire and disturb the colonial hinterland of our rivals with Islamist revolts until their empires crumble. Jawish explained to Hamza how Prussia formed a nation by uniting the states after a victory over France in 1871. To him, Prussia was a model for Arabs. Jawish edited the first Arabic account of The Islamic World in 1912 and asked, “How did Europe corrupt our lands and Pan-Islamism, الجامعة الإسلامية, do they turn it against us?”

(Pan-) Islamism

During the Great War, the Kaiser supported anti-colonial revolts in the Middle East with guns, money, and experts. In parallel, Ottoman War Minister Enver Pasha tasked the Tunisian Salih ash-Sharif at-Tunisi to adapt the dogma of jihad to a global coalition war and to spread it in Europe. Enver also sent Hamza and Jawish to Berlin into the Foreign Office News Organization for the Orient to work on jihad based on Islamism, الإسلامية. This old Arabic term gained a broader political sense but was not yet tied to a clear theory.

To change it, Hamza and Jawish edited the illustrated monthly The Islamic World in German for Europe from 1916 to 1918. Their target groups were rulers, diplomats, and clerics in the Middle East as well. The two also tried to reach nationalists and Islamists like Amin al-Husaini, later Jerusalem’s grand mufti; Shakib Arslan in the Ottoman parliament and a sponsor of Berlin’s Islam Institute; Mustafa Mansur Rifat, editor of the nationalist paper Al-Liwa’; Abd ar-Rahman Azzam, the first secretary general of the Arab League; and reformers of Arabia via Iran to India. In 1916, Hamza edited The Pan-Islamism, as he synonymously uses “Islamism” in the hope “to have clearly stated the theory of Islamism”: to unify all Muslims in one brotherhood and to overcome enemies.

Mission and Model

Hamza sketches a mission: Individuals and groups help each other to defend against attacks. The nature of this pan-Islamic unity relates to nationalism and patriotism. However, it has another origin: unity of religion with similar customs, interests, and prospects without regard of nationality, race, or color. In Europe, Hamza explains, patriotic and national feelings grow on the unity of race. Great results of a group correlate with its size. The larger the area of rule, the more borders vanish between the peoples the better. Although nationalism and patriotism have a higher ethical and practical value than tribalism, the highest goal is philanthropy and unification. Hamza quotes poet Friedrich Schiller that “all humans equally born are a noble kind.”

The Egyptian model is Germany after 40 years of its unity. He warns, though, if a union turns aggressive, then it is the right and duty of nations to fight it. Islamism rescinded the racial reasons of disputes among Arab tribes: a great Islamic Empire grew into a high culture. The fraternization reduced clashes of Islamic races like Persians, Indians, and Egyptians. Confusion about Islamism led non-Muslims to think that its only sense is Islamic unity for aggressive aims. In truth, argues Hamza, the call for Islamism advertises for humankind’s brotherhood based on the unity of faith. He quotes Koranic rules, such as to fight attackers, but do not exceed in defense; and pacts with non-Muslim peoples are viable who do not fight Islam, drive out Muslims, or take their land.

Allies and Brotherhoods

Hamza adds non-religious roots of Islamism: the poor economic state of peoples. Even worse is the political condition of masses due to the colonial policy of France in Tunis, Algiers, and Morocco. The same is true in India and Egypt after the loss of their sovereignty to the British. Persia lost her independence, and Russia rules over many Muslims. Russia had also just tried to destroy the Ottoman Empire’s independence with Paris and London. As a result, Hamza says the people need a great unity and force to resist imperial foes. Muslims will awake, predicts Hamza, and rise against the tyrannical despotism of France, England, and Russia. The goal of Islamism lies in uniting a large part of the world by liberating peoples of foreign rule. Muslims fell to their enemies’ greed and failed to adapt to the faster pace of the new times. Islamism will be a thorn in the eye of those who want to plunder nations. However, this did not include Germany, where Islamism meets broad understanding and official support.

Then, Hamza announces his article on Pan-Islamism’s Practical Goals. In mid-1917, he names Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani the spiritual founder of Islamism, but Hamza laments that the Islamist movement lacks a “programmatic organization and action.” There is a need to create a political society in Istanbul with affiliates in capitals to unite Muslims and to get help for their economies.

Minorities and Gaps

As Hamza edited his Theory of Islamism, the Great War intensified. The Ottoman call for a coalition jihad turned also against local minorities: an attempted genocide hit Jews in Greater Syria and a realized genocide killed Christians like Armenians, Greeks, and Assyrians. Grand Vizier Talat Pasha wanted to “disperse the Armenians like the Jews in western Europe,” while Enver Pasha confirmed an ongoing extermination in late 1915. Hamza ignores all these atrocities.

To live without regard of nationality, race, or color is a great revolutionary idea, though only to be done inclusively. Hamza’s ideal goes beyond tribes for a higher unity of faith. Looking to the roots of his ideology and the Muslim Brotherhood, his theory seems to be its birth certificate. He blames colonialists for all miseries, asking about Islamic lands: Why did some fail to adapt to a faster pace of modern times? He implies that something went wrong before the colonial era. If those lands would have been a solid state, then colonization could not have taken place there. Hamza disregards the longer Islamic colonization that Jawish describes in his mid-1917 text as “expansion by wars of faith.”

Current Islamism’s Historical Roots

Co-editor Jawish asks about the misuse of Islamism against its own interests. The German-Ottoman jihadization that he advanced was a “revolutionary” blow against the usually moderate if not conservative modernism. In the then-unleashed radicalization, Berlin was driven less by an affinity to Islam, but rather by the potential of jihadist revolts against the empires of London, Paris, and Petersburg. Half a century ago, colonies gained independence, and formal liberation succeeded. Most leaders turned to nation building. After nationhood, some countries and leaders turned away from Islamism—just to revive it in the new millennium. Consider Jawish: Mustafa Kemal put him on top of an Islamism campaign. Jawish also swayed Hasan al-Banna who kept the Muslim Brotherhood going in the Egyptian town of al-Ismailiyya. In 1917, as shown, Hamza already suggested the creation of an avant-gardist political organization as one Muslim Brotherhood with affiliates in other Islamic capitals. There is still a missing historical connection between Hamza’s theory and al-Banna’s founding of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928. It was a stop-and-go story with disruptions and revivals. A 1917 report claimed that before World War I, Jawish’s task was to create Muslim brotherhoods in Arabia and India. Berlin used them to spread jihad. Hamza envisaged just one Muslim Brotherhood with affiliates. Suddenly, Kemal stopped all Islamism and planned pan-Islamic unions between Turkey, Russia, and Iran. He abolished the sultanate and caliphate. Since 1931, as Egypt’s ambassador to Ankara, Hamza watched a new foreign policy unfold without Islamism.

After half a century without colonies, some regard the current wave of Islamism as a third totalitarian ideology. If true, activists advanced it by studying related experiences in Europe and Asia. Islamists of the “Islamic State” acted against minorities, repeating the old patterns. Due to migration, national and global Islamists also apply their ideology in the West where fundraising is worthwhile. Hamza had expected a post-colonial peace. Instead, long warfare is going on.

Conversely, both anti-Islamism and Islamism grow in many parts of the Middle East, where Russia and China returned as great powers and America is leaving. Among regional powers, Israel and Iran built new groups. The great powers active in the region know perhaps a German lesson that there is no need to directly own lands to steer them in a power center’s favor. Thus, there might start a new indirect type of colonization by dissolving borders and defenses of nation states, which could cause a new wave of radicalization. However, moderation also spreads based on the pan-Islamic Charter of Makkah, which was approved by leaders of 139 countries and the Muslim World League in 2019. Time will tell which of those political currents will win the day.

https://www.eurasiareview.com/14052021-understanding-the-origins-of-pan-islamism-during-world-war-i-analysis/

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OP-ED: #Pakistan - Increasing intolerance towards minorities

Zafar Aziz Chaudhry

Earlier this month, a group of Muslim nurses took over a chapel within the grounds of the Punjab Institute of Mental Health. Their sole objective was to raze it and turn it into a mosque. They reportedly began reciting Islamic prayers while threatening their Christian counterparts with (false) charges of blasphemy unless they converted to Islam. That this happened during the holy month of Ramzan makes it all the more deplorable.

Pakistan has been named, along with nine others nations, by the US as the worst violators of religious freedom. Since this country’s creation in 1947, we have fallen into the trap of pursuing the same policies that prompted the Muslims to carve out a separate homeland in South Asia. Furthermore, we have increasingly drifted towards a distorted version of Islam which we have been force-fed by a divided and misguided clergy driven by their own vested interests and who thrive on preaching bigotry and intolerance of other religions. 

Experience has shown that wayward addresses from pulpits have done more damage than good to the Islamic Umma.It is a paradox that religion breeds both compassion and hatred. And visible hatred is more pronounced than compassion. Far too often, religion and faith, once sources of consolation, have now become triggers for hostility between majority and minority communities. Sadly, the social-bonding rituals of religion usually breeds disdain towards outsiders. Prior to the 19th century, the Indian subcontinent was a battleground of various faiths and beliefs. But the spread of humanism in Europe came to be felt in India under the stewardship of leaders like Ram Mohan Roy, Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, Mahatma Gandhi, MA Jinnah and Dr Mohammad Iqbal. Resultantly, the sharp edge of orthodox religion was blunted, giving rise to inter-religious harmony. Yet on the political plane, the age-old rivalry between Hindus and Muslims continued as before and culminated in the birth of Pakistan.

The fact that no arrests have been made so far nor any action taken against those who forcibly occupied a Christian place of worship speaks volumes about our ‘fair’ treatment of minorities

General Zia, in his enthusiasm to impose his own brand of Islam on the country, is always singled out as leaving indelible scars on the national psyche that will probably never fully heal; most notably through the introduction of the now notorious blasphemy laws. According to criminal jurisprudence, an offence bears three components. First, is mens rea (‘guilty mind’, that is, a person’s intention to commit a crime). Second, is the physical movement towards its commission. Third, is the execution of the crime itself. In the absence of one of these components, the offence cannot be proved against the accused. The case of S 295-C of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC), which was introduced by an act of Parliament in 1986, made it a criminal offence to make derogatory remarks against the Holy Prophet (PBUH). However, those who framed this law — intentionally or unintentionally — omitted to include mens rea . The result being that an individual charged with this offence cannot avoid the death sentence as there is no wiggle-room to prove intention. Thus, this omission gives unbridled powers to law enforcement agents to implicate anyone, whether Muslim or non-Muslim, for the grave offence of blasphemy. Naturally, minority communities have the most to fear in this regard.

Most countries in the world have blasphemy laws on the books and Pakistan is no exception, with the origins for these provisions dating back to British rule. Yet, here, the problem lies in the inherent jurisprudential flaw in drafting S 295-C (PPC). Reforming this provision ought not to be difficult, in theory at least. After all, the military dictator under whose rule these draconian laws were introduced had no pretensions of either being a legal or an Islamic scholar. And since Parliament introduced the aberration of S 295-C, it naturally has the right to vote on its fate. This is the only way to accord full rights to Pakistan’s minorities, while also reining in the police.

It is unfortunate that under the government of Imran Khan, incidents targeting minorities are on the rise. The ruling PTI must come down hard on culprits and ensure punishment in accordance with the law. This is also essential to restore Pakistan’s image internationally; where we are seen as a nation of bigots and fanatics. The fact that no arrests have been made so far nor any action taken against those who forcibly occupied a Christian place of worship speaks volumes about our “fair” treatment of minorities.

https://dailytimes.com.pk/755244/increasing-intolerance-towards-minorities/

Pakistan Faces Tough Choices In Post-US Afghanistan -Analysis

 By Saif Khattak

President Biden’s announcement last month regarding an unconditional US military withdrawal from Afghanistan has altered the geopolitical landscape of the region. Russia and China are cautious of a potential spillover of militancy into their borders. Iran and Saudi Arabia are moving towards normalization of ties. India has shown resentment over a move that would see its influence in Afghanistan diminished. But none of them face as perplexing a situation as faced by Pakistan – a country that will have to make tough choices in the days to come.

For decades now, Pakistan has been regarded as the mediator of choice when it comes to negotiations with the Taliban. It has been widely credited for bringing the Taliban on board with the Afghan peace process. The relations between the Pakistani establishment and the Taliban are no secret – the former is believed to hold significant influence over the latter. With the Taliban now increasingly becoming stronger within Afghanistan, many believe the present course of events project a win for Islamabad.

As it turns out, such a view is quite myopic. At present, the Taliban are preventing substantial progress in the intra-Afghan negotiations, biding their time till the departure of US and NATO troops. In the past two weeks, there has been an escalation in the number of skirmishes between the Taliban and Afghan security forces, both vying for control over areas previously under supervision of US troops. President Biden’s announcement seems to have emboldened the Taliban, who are now more likely to pursue a hostile takeover of the country rather than accept a political settlement based on compromise.

Islamabad’s recent activities suggest that it is not too keen on the idea of the Taliban having absolute power in Afghanistan. Since last year, Pakistan has sought to diversify its options by cultivating relations with multiple political actors in Kabul. It first hosted Dr Abdullah Abdullah, who leads Afghanistan’s High Council of National Reconciliation – a person previously sidelined by Islamabad. And later a visit was arranged to Kabul by a Pakistani delegation led by Prime Minister Imran Khan. More recently, Pakistan was part of the extended Troika meeting that urged parties in Afghanistan to reach a political settlement, condemning violence and cautioning against a potential Spring offensive by the Taliban – one that seems to have already begun.

Pakistan’s preference of a political settlement that sees the Taliban having a share of power rather than absolute Taliban control over Kabul is based on a couple of reasons.

First, Islamabad’s influence over the Taliban has waned over the past decade. Earlier relations between both parties were an extension of the spirit of Afghan Jihad against the Soviet Union. The Taliban’s previous leadership has now been replaced by a new generation, embodied by the likes of Mullah Yaqoob and Mullah Abdul Hakim Ishaqzai, who have not operated side by side with Pakistani intelligence officers, nor have they been acculturated through long stays in Pakistan. Their present relation with Pakistan is one of convenience, and one that is likely to weaken once the Taliban move out of their position of dependence.

Second, if the Taliban – who are mostly ethnic Pashtuns – hold a monopoly on power in Kabul, it is likely that it would incite Pashtun nationalism on Pakistan’s western border. Pashtun nationalism lies at the base of Pakistan’s longstanding border dispute with Afghanistan over the Durand line. Islamabad wants a government in Kabul that would see a favorable resolution to this dispute but a Taliban regime provides no such guarantees – especially, given the fact that the Taliban were against it when they previously held power.

But there is a catch to not supporting the Taliban’s complete hold on power: it provides maneuvering room for Pakistan’s traditional rival, India. The current political establishment in Kabul has developed cordial relations with New Delhi over the past two decades. During this time, India has invested over $3 billion in Afghanistan, developing its soft power while strategically encircling Pakistan and thwarting Islamabad’s strategic depth doctrine. Any political arrangement that comes out of the intra-Afghan negotiations is likely to have elements of the current political establishment, and hence, some level of Indian influence in it. India could leverage its economic strength to improve its position in the new dynamic arising after a successful dialogue. Islamabad would want to see this influence diminished but its only available option to avoid this outcome is backing the Taliban’s hold on power and dealing with its repercussions.

Moreover, even if the previously mentioned dilemma does not play itself out and Islamabad finds the perfect balance between both options, there are other factors at play that do not bode well for Pakistan. Over the past four decades, more than 4 million Afghan refugees have made their way across the border into Pakistan. Not only will it be a challenge for Islamabad to ensure the return of these refugees, it might also face blowback as a result of demographic changes caused by their return.

But an even worse situation seems to be on the cards for Pakistan. The current course of events in Afghanistan makes the possibility of stability unlikely in the near future. In the best-case scenario, a political settlement might be reached in which the Taliban have a significant hold on power. Given the record of the Taliban’s previous regime, some are predicting that more refugees will flow out of Afghanistan even if the best case scenario is realized. Pakistan, being an immediate neighbor, will have to bear the brunt of this regional refugee influx. Such a situation would have extreme effects on Pakistan’s economy, which is already struggling as the result of the pandemic.

In the past, as much as 75% of Kabul’s expenditure was supported through foreign assistance. The withdrawal of US troops marks a decrease in the United States’ interest in the region and makes the future of foreign assistance to Afghanistan uncertain. Over the years, the Afghan government has failed to develop substantial revenue sources that would sustain administrative functioning if foreign aid were cut off. On the other hand, the Taliban have greatly depended on the narcotics trade to finance their operations. A regime in Kabul under the influence of the Taliban might compensate for discontinued aid by turning to its current revenue source. Since most opium cultivation in Afghanistan occurs in the region bordering Pakistan, a significant rise in drug smuggling would be observed across the border – a challenge Pakistan previously faced in the 1980s. Such an outcome would have detrimental effects on Pakistani society, requiring years of effort and immense resources to counter it.

The present situation in Afghanistan marks out some very tough choices for Pakistan. On one hand, the Taliban’s rise to power will provide Pakistan with influence in Kabul. On the other, a strengthened Taliban are likely to act independently and against Pakistani interests. President Biden’s announcement seems to have ended the endless war for the United States. But for Pakistan, the real struggle might have just begun.

https://www.eurasiareview.com/14052021-pakistan-faces-tough-choices-in-post-us-afghanistan-analysis/

COVID: What's behind Pakistan's low vaccination rate?

 

Experts have said that negative publicity combined with a shortage of vaccines are keeping people from getting inoculated. The country has vaccinated just 0.8% of its total population.

As other South Asian countries roll out their vaccine programs, critics have said that Pakistan's vaccination drive is moving along at a much slower rate. As of May 6, Pakistan had vaccinated 3.32 million people, or just 0.8% of its population of 216 million. The percentage of vaccinations per 100 people also stands at just 1.53%, against the global average of 16.44%. Both the federal and provincial governments have set up hundreds of vaccination centers. 

However, experts say that a combination of limited vaccine availability and widespread hesitancy due to negative publicity have contributed to the low number of inoculations relative to the population. More than 860,000 infections have been reported in the country since the start of the pandemic, while nearly 19,000 people have died. Vaccination 'could take a decade' Dr. Abdul Ghafoor Shoro of the Pakistan Medical Association believes it could take up to a decade to inoculate every citizen if the country continues its vaccination drive at the current pace. Even health care workers are still waiting to be vaccinated, Shoro told DW. Citizens, he added, have also expressed some hesitancy due to propaganda against the vaccine.

 Meanwhile, the Brazilian, South African and UK variants could quickly plunge the country into a deeper health crisis, he said. Dr. Ashraf Nizami, a Lahore-based medical expert, said that the government did not do enough to counter the negative media that is attracting the attention of millions on social media. Both Nizami and Shoro believe that rumors about side effects of the vaccines, especially regarding the AstraZeneca inoculation, are contributing to widespread hesitancy. Muhammad Iqbal Khan Afridi, a parliamentarian from the ruling Tehreek-e-Insaf party, echoed those beliefs. Out of 35 family members, he said he was the only one to get the vaccination so far. Afridi added that influential clerics are also using mosques to spread negative messages about the vaccine. 

 A number of prominent clerics and personalities, including a famous defense analyst, have voiced vehement opposition to the vaccine, coming up with conspiracy theories and calling on citizens not to get vaccinated. Such messages are not new in the South Asian country, where clerics and extremists have openly opposed the polio vaccine, keeping Pakistan on the list of just a few nations where the disease still exists. 

Several attacks against those issuing polio vaccines have also been reported in previous years. Low availability, difficult registration Dr. Abdur Rashid of the Drugs Regulatory Authority of Pakistan believes that the slow rollout is primarily due to a shortage of available vaccines. "Countries all over the world are scrambling to get vaccines. We were lucky to have China provide us with more than 1.5 million. We are trying to get vaccines from wherever we can," Rashid told DW.

On the condition of anonymity, a senior government official also blamed the slow pace on the shortage of vaccines. "We are trying to get as many vaccines as possible and might get 18.7 million doses by June," he told DW.

Sindh province's health minister, Dr. Azra Fazal Pechuho, said that the registration system is also partially to blame for the pace. "The portal launched by the federal government is slow, so people find it difficult to register. However, the Sindh government is asking people to just walk into their nearest vaccine centers if they are of eligible age," Pechuho told DW.

Others, however, contest the claim that the vaccination rate is too slow. Dr. Ikram Ullah Khan, an official from the northwestern city of Peshawar, told DW that around 65,000 out of 75,000 total health care workers have been vaccinated in the city.

The rest would be inoculated soon, he said, adding that the province has already vaccinated more than 450,000 people and plans to give shots to over 10 million people by December this year.

Pechuho believes that the heart-wrenching scenes of relatives and loved ones dying in India have also made a deep impact on people's impression of the vaccine in Pakistan, and have encouraged more people to register.

Vaccine registration on the rise

On May 4, Asad Umar, Pakistan's federal minister of planning, development and special initiatives, announced that more than 164,000 people had been vaccinated in a single day, and around 200,000 people the following day. Additionally, he said, the pace of registration had also picked up. 

Meanwhile in Sindh, authorities have launched a center that could be used to vaccinate 30,000 people a day. "We are setting up more such centers and will ask people over the age of 18 to just walk in," Pechuho told DW. "A mobile service is also vaccinating those who are bedridden and people with disabilities."

Additionally, the government of Punjab, Pakistan's most populous province, is setting up new centers to offer the vaccine to around 80,000 people per day.

Rashid believes that Pakistan will solve its vaccination issue. "We are seeking cooperation with China, which has agreed to get vaccines filled and packaged in Pakistan," he said, adding that the Drugs Regulatory Authority is allowing another Chinese company to carry out clinical trials of a different vaccine which would consist of three doses.

"With all of this, we will not have a supply problem and will have enough vaccines to vaccinate all Pakistanis," he said.

Chairman PPP Bilawal Bhutto Zardari appoints office bearers of PYO District Larkano

 Chairman Pakistan Peoples Party Bilawal Bhutto Zardari has appointed following office bearers of PYO District Larkano with immediate effect.

1. Imran Ali Sethar (President)
2. Ghulam Asghar Narejo (Senior Vice President)
3. Agha Baddardin Jatoi (Vice President-I)
4. Abdul Jabbar Memon (Vice President-II)
5. Amjad Ali Brohi (Vice President-III)
6. Mehran Khan Khaskheli (General Secretary)
7. Abdul Ghafar Malano (Deputy General Secretary-I)
8. Istiqamat Ali Samo (Deputy General Secretary-II)
9. Toufiq Ahmed Bhutto (Information Secretary)
10. Fahad Hussain Lashari (Deputy Information Secretary)
11. Javed Ali Chandio (Public Relation Secretary)
12. Sadam Hussain Junejo (Finance Secretary)
13. Sadaqat Ali Mirali (Record & Events Secretary)

Notification in this regard was issued from the Chairman’s Secretariat by his Political Secretary Jameel Soomro here today.

Released by
Surendar Valasai
Incharge
Media Cell Bilawal House

https://www.ppp.org.pk/pr/24800/