It is time to talk about caste in Pakistan and Pakistani diaspora

On September 29, Manisha Valmiki, a 19-year-old Dalit girl succumbed to her injuries from a gang rape committed by four Thakur (upper-caste) men in the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh. News of the incident caused outrage across India and the rest of the world, including in Pakistan and the diaspora.
I and many fellow Pakistanis have actively participated in social media campaigns demanding justice for Valmiki. But few of us have said much about another horrendous death of a Dalit woman.On September 30, just a day after Valmiki’s death, 17-year-old Momal Meghwar took her own life in the village of Dalan-Jo-Tarr in Sindh province, Pakistan. A year earlier, she had been brutally raped and filmed by three men who have remained at large.Meghwar was the 58th woman to take her own life this year in Thar alone. There is a multitude of reasons for this macabre statistic and all are at the intersections of gender, religion, class, and caste.Yes, caste – a word which many of us Pakistani feminist scholars and organisers, especially those with sectarian, caste, and class privileges in the diaspora, remain unfamiliar with, whether willfully or out of ignorance.
Of course, due to the untiring work of mostly (but not exclusively) Indian-origin Dalit feminists and organisations such as Equality Labs, those of us Pakistanis who have not thought about caste before are learning about caste in India and its diaspora.
However, concerns raised by Dalit and anti-caste thinkers from Pakistan often remain ignored and outright dismissed, especially by caste and class privileged Pakistani Muslims who refuse to see caste, let alone the caste dominance and caste terror prevalent in Pakistan and its diaspora.
Pakistanis need to stop believing that Dalits live only in India. There are about 40 castes, 32 of which were listed as scheduled castes under the November 1957 Presidential ordinance of Pakistan. Meghwars are one of these listed castes, along with Bheels, Kolhis, Baghris and others.
While there are Dalit Muslims in Pakistan, because of the belief that there are no caste hierarchies among Muslims, the castes mentioned as scheduled are necessarily read as Hindu only. It is important to point out the infusion of upper-caste Brahmin supremacy that has coerced and contained lower-caste people into the category of Hindu. Many Dalit-Bahujan people see themselves as part of Indigenous cultures and traditions and reject Hinduism as their religious identification.
Moreover, the majority of Christians in the country are also Dalit – pejoratively labelled as Chuhra. As a recent New York Times article on Dalit Christians taking up scavenging jobs in Pakistan notes, according to the 1998 census, Christians made up only 1.6 percent of the population but filled 80 percent of the sweeper jobs. This caste apartheid is prevalent in Pakistan and yet there is no authentic caste census available.
Just like in India, Dalits face discrimination by society at large and by the state. In a 2007 report on the condition of scheduled castes in Pakistan, journalist Zulfiqar Shah points out that a 6-percent government job quota for scheduled castes from urban and rural areas put forward in 1948 was never ethically implemented and was simply scrapped in the 1990s.
In other words, no political or economic security measures are extended to scheduled caste people who continue to be seen simply as “religious minorities” in Pakistan and marked for violence with impunity.
That is why it is important to call Momal Meghwar’s rape and death by suicide what it is: caste-based sexual violence. While Pakistani mainstream media has mostly stayed silent, in some instances where the incident was discussed, it was made into a case of her being Hindu, a religious minority, effectively erasing caste which is also one of the main factors legitimising violence against lower-caste people by both upper-caste Muslims and Hindus.
The murder of social media celebrity Qandeel Baloch in 2016, which was widely covered by the media, was also linked to caste, but journalists and scholars overwhelmingly ignored that aspect. One of the people who drew attention in public to the role caste played in the killing was anti-caste activist, Auwn Gurmani.
As he explained in a July 2020 tweet: “We remember Qandeel and we also remember she was killed because of her gender, class and most importantly caste background: Qandeel’s caste was Mehra (ماہڑا in Siraiki). Mahar, Mehra, Mehar, Mahara – all these castes have the same origin, scheduled caste in Madhya Pradesh.”
Caste dismissal in Pakistan often comes from the belief that because we are Muslim, caste does not exist in our communities and societies. Unlike Hindu scriptures, the Quran does not establish and condone a caste system. Moreover, unlike India, Pakistan does not have Brahminical cis-heteropatriarchy and Islamophobia governing the nation-state.
The ritualistic, religious, familial, social, economic, political and gendered aspects of caste have their own tones in Pakistan. It is not saffron-tinted, as Hindu nationalism is, but rather it takes a green, Islamic traditional, hue. This is not to say that the importation and translation of Hindutva ideology are not happening across the border and do not affect Pakistani Muslims’ conception of caste.
As Sindhi anti-caste scholar Ghulam Hussain, who has contributed ground-breaking work on caste relations in Sindh, notes, Sayedism and Brahminism are infused with each other. Sayed supremacy – which Hussain labels as Sayedism – comes from the (unproven) belief that Sayeds are genealogical descendants of Prophet Muhammad and therefore have a more authentic grasp on Islam and all social and political matters.
Another anti-caste researcher, Haris Gazdar, points out that “the public silencing on caste contrasts with an obsession with it in private dealings”. There is always violence attached to caste hierarchies of which Gazdar names several examples, such as having pejorative labels to strict taboos around eating and drinking together and sharing of utensils to stealing land to beatings and rapes of men and women of lowered caste people with impunity, all to “keep them in their place”. Islam is often evoked by upper-caste Muslims as the reason for some of these practices. Pakistani Muslims would argue that lowered caste people from Hindu and Christian minorities eat “haram” (forbidden by Islamic law) food. However, eating with upper-caste Hindus and Christians is not frowned upon.
These Brahminical notions of ritual purity become aligned with concepts of “paak” (pure/clean) and “naapak” (impure/unclean) under Muslims’ casteist interpretations of Islam. Even when lowered caste people from religious minorities convert to Islam, they continue to meet with the same caste-based violence. Conversion to Islam in Pakistan does not de-casteise the lowered caste people who continue to be treated as “untouchables”.
There is also the commonly circulated argument that caste exists only in rural areas of provinces like Sindh and Punjab. But caste dangerously circulates as common sense in large cities as well.
A recent example of this, even among young people who are usually understood as more progressive than their parents’ generation, is a student-led survey at the University of Lahore in Punjab in which students were asked on camera questions about how caste informs choices they make about romantic relationships and friendships. Every single one of these students knew their caste from Sayeds to Arains (a predominantly agricultural caste) to Sheikhs (a lower caste stereotyped as having a business acumen). In the almost nine-minute-long video, it is quite clear that caste is an active and everyday experience for university students in an urban setting.
More survey work needs to be done in urban and rural areas, as well as in the diaspora to fully understand the forms which caste takes at our dinner tables, in our kinships, our attachments, workplaces, and every other aspect of our lives. As many of us diasporic Pakistanis become invested in liberatory projects of Black Lives Matter and Indigenous sovereignties in the west and educated about caste politics in India, it appears that this is indeed the right time to turn inwards and explore our own experiences with caste. Sayedism – a prime example of upper-caste dominance and hegemony – is quite prominent among us and should be studied both in Pakistan and in the diaspora.
In our pursuit of understanding caste, however, we also need to be very careful, particularly us western-educated, class- and caste-privileged diasporic scholars. Some of us go to Pakistan to focus on caste violence in the menial jobs lower castes are relegated to, such as scavenging or sanitation work.
While I think these anthropological studies have their place and must be done, I am also reminded of scholar Joby Mathew’s remarks in the book Hatred in the Belly: “If any intellectual wants to emphasize the pathetic condition of Dalits through these derogatory images [of scavenging], that itself amounts to symbolic violence”. Furthermore, when looking into caste-based, gender-based violence and trying to understand a figure such as Baloch in all her complexities, our analysis needs to move beyond the binaries of lower-caste women as either vulnerable victims or heroes. Therefore, it is urgent that we engage with Dalit feminist theory.
And finally, we also have to remain aware and mindful of how Islamophobia and anti-Pakistan violence can be disruptive in our critical work on complicity in various structures of domination. To talk about violence in Pakistan is difficult because of how quickly nationalist non-Muslim Indians – and even those Indian Muslims invested in the idea of Brahminical India – latch onto our critiques to further malign Pakistan as a terrorist Muslim state.
But the intense Islamophobia, casteism, and colonial violence – in relation to Kashmir, for example – in India should not be a reason not to have these important conversations and studies in Pakistan and the diaspora. After all, these violent paradigms are interconnected and know no borders.
https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2020/12/15/it-is-time-to-talk-about-caste-in-pakistan-and-pakistani-diaspora

Pakistani officials may have met with Israelis amid rumor of peace deal

Among those who have spoken out about this possibility is Noor Dahri the founder of the British think tank Islamic Theology of Counter Terrorism.
Pakistani officials may have met with Israelis officials amid rumors, including diplomatic circles, that Pakistan could be the next country to normalize ties with Israel.Among those who have spoken out about this possibility is Noor Dahri the founder of the British think tank Islamic Theology of Counter Terrorism.
He has been fairly active on twitter, with respect to the meeting, noting, "soon I am going to disclose a recent secret but successful meeting between the Pakistani politician and Israeli politicians in Tel Aviv." 
Dahri provided more details of the trip in this i24 interview.


Pakistan has in the past rejected speculation of a deal with Israel.
But Dahri in his i24 interview said that in the past said that former Pakistani Prime Ministers Nawaz Sharif set two delegations to Israel to explore normalization of ties and Benazir Bhutto met with a Israeli delegation in Washington and sent a delegation to Israel. Pakistan has been publicly hostile to Israel over the Palestinian issue, but there is a long history of covert ties between the two countries, Dahri said in a telephone interview with The Jerusalem Post.
An opportunity has opened now as well in light of the shifting geo-political reality in which such relations with Israel are no longer taboo in the Arab and Muslim world, Dahri said. This includes the US brokered Abraham Accords under whose rubric Israel has normalized this with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain and is in the process of doing so with Sudan and Morocco.
"Openly they [Pakistan] are telling its people we are not going forward without the establishment of a Palestinian state," Dahri said. But it is a hard position to hold onto in light of the Abraham Accords and the possibility of normalized deal with Saudi Arabia, he added. "Now is the time, because Arab countries want Pakistan to openly establish ties with Israel, he said. The Arab states want to break Pakistan away from Turkey and the Iranian alliance and bring it into their emerging diplomatic circle with Israel, Dahri said.
Saudi Arabia has the UAE generated pressure on Pakistan to normalize relations with Israel, as well as minimize relations with Turkey," he said. Pakistan is hoping that a deal with Israel would help it improve its ties with Saudi Arabia, which has stopped financial assistance and oil exports to Pakistan, Dahri said. Similarly Pakistan ties with the UAE are at a low point, such that the UAE has halted visas for Pakistan citizens, he added. Pakistanis who live and work in Saudi Arabia provide a $1.5 billion to $2.5 billion boost to Pakistan's economy, so the country's economy would shrink unless the visa ban is reversed, he said.
"Both Arab countries [Saudi Arabia and the UAE] have asked Pakistan to stop its alliance with Turkey and normalize relations with Israel. "In return Saudi Arabia will reinstate financial assistance and start providing the oil to Pakistan" and the UAE would reissue visas, he said. Pakistan is also in need of an ally in the region, to balance out India's growing ties with Middle East countries such as the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Israel, he added.
The Trump administration has continued to work in its last weeks toward creating normalization deals between Israel and Arab, Muslim and African states. White House special advisor Jared Kushner is expected to travel with an Israeli delegation to Morocco next Tuesday. Israeli Intelligence Minister Eli Cohen has speculated that other deals could include Oman and Indonesia, but has not mentioned Pakistan.
https://www.jpost.com/arab-israeli-conflict/pakistani-officials-may-have-met-with-israelis-amid-rumor-of-peace-deal-652408

49 years later, lessons that remain to be learnt from 1971 India-Pakistan War



In episode 641 of #CutTheClutter, Shekhar Gupta unpacks the volatile 1960s that led to the short but bloody war in 1971. On 16 December 1971, India won a decisive victory over Pakistan after a 13-day war that led to the creation of Bangladesh. While it was a short and decisive war, 4,000 soldiers were killed and more than 8,000 were injured.
On the war’s 49th anniversary, ThePrint’s editor-in-chief Shekhar Gupta unpacks the volatile decade of 1960s which preceded the war, in episode 641 of ‘Cut The Clutter’.
The 1971 war settled the problems for the people of East Pakistan, but did not solve India’s problem with Pakistan or Kashmir; in fact, it made the blood feud more intense, said Gupta. “This gives us the lesson that wars rarely solve the central problem, even if they are decisive,” he added. According to Gupta, the 1960s was a decade of wars in India that one should look back at, to understand present circumstances.
Goa annexation, war with China and Pakistan
Soon after the Goa operation (annexation of Goa from the Portuguese) in 1961, the Chinese attacked India in 1962. Then, in April 1965, Pakistanis came knocking at India’s door in Kutch, Gujarat, said Gupta. Pakistan brought their brigade of troops and tanks, but India tactically did not deploy heavy forces in that area, which led Pakistan to believe that India was incapable of fighting a war and thus launched a full-fledged operation to take Kashmir back from India.
However, Pakistan realised soon enough that they had miscalculated the calibre of the Indian Armed Forces. Pakistanis, then, had a big technological advantage, but they were not able to use it, noted Gupta.
On the ground, he added, the war was a stalemate. But in principle, even though India did not win, Pakistan lost because their only objective of taking away Kashmir was not fulfilled.
War with China, again
In 1967 came the big skirmish with the Chinese in the Nathu La pass in East Sikkim, which lasted a few days but was much more intense. The casualties on both sides were quite high. But this taught India that they could withstand the Chinese and Chinese also learned that Indian Armed Forces were no longer a pushover. During that decade, Naga insurgency was also at its peak. In January 1966, Mizo insurgency also started and for the first time the government used the Indian Air Force against its own people. Other separatist movements were also going on at the same time — Punjab and Haryana had separated in 1966 and the Dravidian movement in South India was also underway.
Lessons from 1960s
A lot of what is happening today has been determined by what happened during the 1960s, said Gupta.
India is currently going through its most insecure phase in history externally and internally.
“But to understand the crisis, we have to remember how we survived during the 60s. The second thing to remember is that even though a war is decisive, both the sides lose something, and war is a ‘messy business’,” Gupta added. War also gives us an insight into the history, culture and ideologies of a nations, he noted Ahmadiyyas in Pakistan are a minority and are not allowed to call themselves Muslims. And two war heroes from Pakistan were not celebrated as much just because they belonged to this community. Gupta noted the Pakistan Army had occupied Chamb sector of Kashmir in both the wars. In 1965, the commander was Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik who was an Ahmadiyya. But at that time when Pakistan had an advantage over India, President Ayub Khan decided to change the division commander and replaced Malik with Yahya Khan, who led the Pakistani army to surrender in 1971.
In 1971, Pakistan decided to attack Chamb again and the mission was brilliantly conducted. It ultimately broke Indian defences and Pakistanis captured Chamb again.
The operation was led by Major General Iftikhar Khan Janjua, who had also given India a “bloody nose” during the operation in Kutch, said Gupta.
However, he was an Ahmadiyya, too, and died in a helicopter crash during that war.
After the 1971 war, the Ahmadiyyas were victimised even more and then Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto decided to take Pakistan towards more Islamisation.
While the creation of Bangladesh was a big success, after 1971, the re-Islamisation of Pakistan was a setback for the subcontinent, concluded Gupta.
https://theprint.in/opinion/49-years-later-lessons-that-remain-to-be-learnt-from-1971-india-pakistan-war/568503/