By NAHAL TOOSI
Threats of pressure to get Islamabad on board with defeating the Afghan Taliban mark a potential break from the softer approach adopted under Bush and Obama.
President Donald Trump's announcement Monday that he would extend the U.S. military role in Afghanistan was accompanied by tough warnings to Pakistan – a country that U.S. officials have long viewed as a duplicitous, unreliable partner whose cooperation is nonetheless crucial to defeating the Afghan Taliban.
Trump accused Pakistan of “housing the very terrorists that we are fighting,” and threatened to cut financial aid if the country doesn’t do more to stop the flow of militants. Trump even appealed to Pakistan’s chief nemesis, India, to step up its involvement in Afghanistan’s economy and broader development.
“We can no longer be silent about Pakistan’s safe havens for terrorist organizations, the Taliban, and other groups that pose a threat to the region and beyond,” the Republican president said. “Pakistan has much to gain from partnering with our effort in Afghanistan. It has much to lose by continuing to harbor criminals and terrorists.”
Trump’s comments signal a potential break from efforts by Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama, who, despite intense and often-voiced frustration with Islamabad, preferred to use money and diplomacy to push Pakistan to stop giving Afghan Taliban militants support and sanctuary.
The speech reflected the Trump administration’s preference for the stick over the carrot. Cracking down on Pakistan was “one of the necessary changes in U.S. policy” if the latest strategy for Afghanistan is going to succeed, a senior White House aide said.
The Pakistani embassy declined to offer immediate comment.
As they reviewed their South Asia strategy over the past several months, Trump aides split into two, somewhat overlapping camps on Pakistan, according to sources with knowledge of the talks. Both groups agreed it was time to raise the pressure on Islamabad but differed in how far to go.
One group pushed measures such as cutting off all U.S. military aid and revoking Pakistan’s status as a major non-NATO ally. The other camp argued for more incremental steps to avoid losing Islamabad’s cooperation entirely and sparking more violence by Pakistan-backed militant groups.
Trump leaned more toward the more hardline camp, as did CIA director Mike Pompeo, according to a person familiar with the issue. Trump wanted to cut off all military aid to Pakistan, questioning whether the billions spent there had gained the United States anything, this person added.
But several of Trump’s top aides, including Defense Secretary James Mattis and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, preferred a softer approach to the nuclear-armed country of 195 million. The Pentagon was especially worried about keeping U.S. access to Pakistani transportation corridors need to supply troops in Afghanistan, although the U.S. has developed alternative supply lines over the years.
“Pakistan has suffered greatly from terrorism and can be an important partner in our shared goals of peace and stability in the region,” Tillerson said in a statement sent out shortly after Trump spoke. “We look to Pakistan to take decisive action against militant groups based in Pakistan that are a threat to the region.”
Tillerson also added: “India will be an important partner in the effort to ensure peace and stability in the region, and we welcome its role in supporting Afghanistan’s political and economic modernization.”
In his Fort Myer remarks, Trump hinted that Pakistan would see changes in how much money it gets from the United States, though he did not offer specifics.
“We have been paying Pakistan billions and billions of dollars at the same time they are housing the very terrorists that we have been fighting,” Trump said. “That will have to change and that will change immediately.”
Since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, the United States has showered Pakistan with more than $30 billion in military and economic aid to gain its undivided loyalty in the effort to bring peace to Afghanistan.
That yielded little fruit. The Taliban by some estimates now control 40 percent of Afghanistan, and Islamic State terrorists also have made inroads there.
Militants fighting in Afghanistan can still find safe havens just across the border in Pakistan’s tribal regions. Afghan Taliban leaders, as well as some Al-Qaeda leaders, are believed to operate in Pakistani cities such as Karachi. Pakistan also was where Al-Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden spent his final years until a U.S. raid killed him in the city of Abbottabad in 2011 – an episode that deeply soured U.S.-Pakistani relations.
U.S. officials accuse Pakistan’s powerful military and intelligence apparatus of retaining ties to Afghan Taliban groups, including the deadly Haqqani network. Analysts say Islamabad believes that by keeping Afghanistan weak and unstable it can use the country as a staging ground in case of a future conflict with New Delhi. Pakistan and India, which also has nuclear weapons, have fought three major wars since 1947.
“Pakistan’s spoiling power in Afghanistan is really unlimited,” said Moeed Yusuf, a South Asia expert with the U.S. Institute of Peace. “They could make a mess of things much more so than they have now.”
The U.S. has long tried to avoid getting involved in resolving the decades-old Pakistan-India dispute over the Kashmir region and related subjects, and Trump’s speech offered no hint that would change. But his appeal for India to play a greater role in Afghanistan is not likely to play well in Pakistan, which fears the possibility of a future alliance between Afghanistan and India.
“We simultaneously want to work with the Indians and use our improved relationship with them in some tangible way, but we can’t encourage India to be more active in Afghanistan without playing to some of Pakistan’s worst instincts,” said Daniel Markey, a Pakistan expert at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies.
Pakistan denies double-dealing. It points to its fight against armed groups on its own soil, including what’s known as thePakistani Taliban, as evidence of its anti-terrorist credentials. Pakistani leaders complain that U.S. officials rarely acknowledge the deaths of thousands of Pakistanis in terrorist attacks since 2001.
Trump, who nodded to Pakistani sacrifices, seemed especially troubled by the region’s nuclear factor. The concern was shared by past administrations, who worried that radical elements within Pakistan’s armed forces could share nuclear material and know-how with militants.
“We must prevent nuclear weapons and materials from coming into the hands of terrorists and being used against us, or anywhere in the world, for that matter,” Trump said.
The Trump administration has already taken some steps to signal its displeasure with Pakistan. The Pentagon announced last month that it would withhold $50 million in military assistance to Pakistan for not taking sufficient action against the Haqqani network. The Obama administration took a similar step in its final months.
There also have been very few high-level diplomatic or other exchanges between the countries, although Trump, during the transition period, reportedly heaped praise on the country in a call with Pakistan’s prime minister. Neither Tillerson nor Mattis have visited Pakistan, though Mattis did visit Afghanistan in April.
When National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster visited the region the same month, he stopped by Pakistan. But there and in Afghanistan, he hinted that the Trump White House had less patience for Islamabad than its predecessors.
Pakistan’s government has had its own political turmoil recently, which hasn’t helped the relationship with the United States. Nawaz Sharif, the man serving as prime minister when Trump was elected, was ousted from his position last month by the courts over corruption charges.
“I am absolutely shocked at the abject absence of any real urge on either side to engage at the highest level,” said USIP’s Yusuf. “None of the meetings that have happened have been cordial. It’s basically ended up creating more tension.”
One potential consequence of a hardened U.S. approach to Pakistan is that Islamabad may deepen its cooperation with China. Pakistan leaders unhappy with the United States not-so-subtly describe China as an “all-weather friend.”
China’s role came up during the Trump administration’s conversations about Pakistan, the person familiar with the issue said. “There was discussion about how Pakistan has become a client state of China,” the person said.
Trump’s harsher stance on Pakistan also risks delaying the possibility of a negotiated peace settlement between the Afghan Taliban and the Afghan government. Pakistan is believed to be a critical influence on Afghan Taliban leaders who may wish to discuss a settlement.
Markey pointed out that U.S. financial assistance to Pakistan has been decreasing in recent years anyway – in fiscal 2016 it was roughly $1 billion total for security and economic assistance and military reimbursements.
Cutting off those funds isn’t as much of a threat to Pakistan as it could be, despite the country’s economic struggles. Like other observers, Markey also stressed that unless Trump follows up his rhetoric with notable action, Pakistanis will simply shrug it off as the latest in empty American threats.
One way Trump could further signal his displeasure with Pakistan is by ramping up U.S. drone strikes in the country, an option his administration has discussed. The drone program, largely operated by the CIA, is classified, and Trump did not mention it during his Monday night speech.
Obama dramatically increased the use of such drone strikes in Pakistan, especially in the early years of his presidency. The U.S. drones rained down missiles in Pakistan’s tribal regions, killing numerous Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters, including Pakistani Taliban militants opposed to the government in Islamabad.
But such strikes were widely unpopular in Pakistan and contributed to the deep anti-American sentiment there, leading to fears they encouraged more young Pakistanis to sign up as militants.
Ultimately, unless the United States can convince Pakistan that cutting links with Afghan Taliban fighters will benefit it in its rivalry against India, it’s not likely Islamabad will change its ways, said Christopher Kolenda, a former U.S. Army colonel who served four tours in Afghanistan and is now an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security.
“As long as our policy is engaged in self-deception about our ability to change Pakistan’s strategic calculus, we’re going to continue to kick the can around the circle,” he said.
