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Afghan Children, Deprived of School, Tell of Their Deepest Fears

When the first day of the new school year starts in Afghanistan on Thursday, 3.7 million boys and girls won’t be in attendance, because of increased violence, displacement and poverty. The total number — representing roughly one in three school-age Afghan children — is expected to grow this year as violence between Afghan forces and the Taliban intensifies, and Pakistan forces Afghan refugees to return home, according to Save the Children, an advocacy group.

We spoke to five of those children. Here are their stories in their own words; they have been translated and edited. Lina, 12, is from Kapisa Province in northeastern Afghanistan, but her family members were displaced by fighting seven years ago. She now lives in a refugee camp in Kabul. She went to school for three years before being pulled out.

I loved going to school, but we don’t have enough money to buy notebooks and other things. Our relatives are angry at us for leaving school, but without notebooks it was not possible to study and do homework.

If I don’t go to school, I will become nothing in the future; if I go to school, I will become a doctor. I want to become a doctor.

We live in tents here; we have two tents. I sleep with my five brothers and sisters in one tent, and my father, mother, and two small sisters sleep in the other.

For breakfast, if something is left over from dinner we eat that. If not, we eat bread with tea. After breakfast, I bring water from the well, which is a one-hour walk away. Providing drinking water for our home is my responsibility, and I bring water in a wheelbarrow, in these small barrels, two or three times a day. I also collect small pieces of wood and plastic to burn for heating our home. Zahid, 8, is from Surkh Rod, a district in eastern Nangarhar Province. He and his four siblings help his father collect metal scraps in Jalalabad, a nearby city.

All members of my family sleep in one room that we rent for $25 a month. After waking, I wash my face, then I eat my breakfast, which is tea with bread, and then I take my sack and go to the bazaar.

During the day, I collect scraps of metal, wood and paper. For lunch, I wait in front of a bakery — the baker himself or someone else gives me a loaf of bread that I share with my friend or my cousin.

We sell the things we collect during the day for 20 cents, and then I bring the money home and we buy tea, sugar or something else with it. In a whole day, the most I earn is 50 cents.

I do not go to school because we don’t have money to pay school expenses. The 20 cents I earn is to pay for sugar and tea.

My relatives and friends are going to school, and when I see them, I wish I would be able to go to school and do my studies, too. If you go to school, you will have a good future. If you don’t, you will not.

Raqibullah, 12, is from a village on the outskirts of Tirin Kot, a city in Oruzgan Province in southern Afghanistan. His father was killed a year and a half ago by a blast from an improvised explosive device. Raqibullah then moved to Tirin Kot.

When I was in the village, I was going to school, but there are no schools there anymore. I only studied up to fourth grade, but I can still read and write.

In the city, I sell sweets from a cart to feed my siblings. I have three brothers and three sisters, and we all live together. My oldest brother is 14 years old, and the youngest in our family is my 4-year-old sister. My older brother is also working with me. If my father were alive, I would not be spending the day in the bazaar selling things.

My cousins are still in the village where there is no school. But my neighbors here — they attend private school and government schools. When I see boys going to school, I really feel like I should be going, too. But I have to earn money in order to feed my family and afford the rent.

Bakhti, 13, is from the northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif. Her mother died of hepatitis B three years ago. Her father, who works as a day laborer in Iran, left her and her younger brothers in Kabul with their uncle. I wake up around 6 a.m. After breakfast, I do the housework — cleaning, sweeping inside and outside, washing the dishes. If there is a carpet in progress, then I get to help weave the carpet.

From each carpet, I get about 80 cents as a tip. The rest of the money goes to the house expenses. Last time from the 80 cents, I bought a comb for myself and socks for my brothers.

When I lived in Mazar, I studied until fourth grade. When we came to Kabul, I went to school for about three months but then stopped. The classes here were not like those in Mazar. The students did not behave well; they were very violent. They would call me the “strange girl.”

I also stopped going because my two brothers are alone. I am afraid they will get lost — I have to stay and look after them. If my mother was around, I would study. But now I can’t.

My cousins go to school. Those who go to school, they look good. I also want to go to school, but it is not going to happen. Imamuddin, 15, is from Charchino District in Oruzgan Province. After intense fighting in the district, which is now controlled by the Taliban, his father moved half of the family to Tirin Kot.

I studied up to fifth grade in our district, but schools closed a year ago because of fighting, and now the Taliban control our village. There was fighting every day, and I wasn’t even able to leave our house.

My mother and five sisters are still in the district; we are trying to bring them here soon. We live in a rented house, which has three rooms, and we pay about $60 a month for rent. My father, two brothers and I share one room. It’s winter, and to keep a room warm needs a lot of wood, and we can hardly make one room warm.

Life is hard for me here because I do nothing. I am very bored. But I am happy when night comes, and at least I can go to sleep.

I really want to become a doctor and serve the people. I am asking my father to send me to English classes in Tirin Kot, but my father cannot afford the fees. I am studying my old books from school, and I have completed each book many times.

I may start working, or move to another province where we can find a better living. I am worried about my future and education. Life was good back in the district — we had a good living, we had land and orchards and schools and fellow students, but here you do not know anybody. Fighting deprived us of everything.

The Women in Afghanistan’s Moral Prisons

By Ritu Mahendru

Sex before marriage, fleeing abuse, even being raped could land a woman in one of Afghanistan’s moral prisons.

“Oppression of Afghan women did not start with the Taliban nor has it ended with their defeat.” So wrote Anne E. Brodsky in her book, With All Our Strength: The Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan.

Violence against women in Afghanistan occurs due to structural inequalities between women and men, including women’s lack of access to economic, political and social resources. This gender gap is deeply rooted in androcentric and religious fundamentalist values. Afghan girls and women face many forms of violence: threats, torture, rape, child and forced marriages, Baadal (the exchange of daughters or sisters as brides), and Baad (arranged marriages to settle dispute).

Women also face imprisonment for up to five years for so-called moral crimes such as running away from home (even to flee violence) and zina (sex before marriage).

A report by Human Rights Watch states that such incarcerations of girls and women for moral crimes are on the rise. The number increased from about 400 in the autumn of 2011 to about 600 in the spring of 2013. In spite of compelling evidence of the injustice faced by women in Afghanistan, and recommendations by the UN member countries, the Afghan government has categorically rejected abolishing the prosecution of women for moral crimes, which often occur when women are fleeing sexual and gender-based violence (GBV).

How to Wind up in a Moral Prison

Sitting on the floor in a prison courtyard, six Afghan women, aged 18-57, form a semicircle facing one another. They take turns narrating their stories, describing why they were now in the prison. They help each other by adding details from their own experiences of injustice, signaling solidarity without the fear of being judged or heard by the policeman who has been tailing them around in the courtyard.

Tahmeena* is a 24-year-old Tajik female. She refused to sleep with her brother-in-law when her family was away. She was then accused of attempted adultery: “The female police rained batons on me. I kept shouting I haven’t done anything. They [the police and her family] didn’t believe me. There was no trial, just the sentence.”

Zahra, 57 has been in the prison for a year. She killed her husband because of the constant sexual and physical abuse. “I killed him. I stabbed him a few times,” she states unapologetically, and shares a smile with the others that turns into familiar laughter.

Sameena, 19, has been in the prison for six months because she had pre-marital sex with her boyfriend. “He is in prison and I will marry him when I get out of here but I also fear for his and my life,” she says.

Sumaira, 18, was raped by her uncle when she was 16. She now has a year-old daughter and is in prison for having sex outside of marriage. “I was alone in the house when he [the uncle] came to my room, threatened me with a knife and raped me. I didn’t know what was going on,” she recounts. “This happened a few times and a couple of months later I was pregnant. I never told my family because of the fear of getting killed. When they found out at the seventh month, I told them what had happened. My uncle accused me of seducing him and lying. He never faced trial and I was brought here for zina.”

Attacks like the ones these women experienced are a tool to control female sexuality in a climate of impunity with the government failing bring perpetrators to justice. Women in Afghan jails are often sentenced  for so-called moral crimes while religious and influential men are exonerated for the same offenses. The women’s stories make it obvious that the power discrepancy between men and women is the root cause of their imprisonment.

Humaira, 18, ran away from home at the age of 13 to escape baad. She was accused of “moral crimes” and was subjected to forced “virginity tests.”

“They did virginity tests on me. I kept saying no but they ignored my cries,” she says. “The tests were negative but the guy who was forcing me to marry him bribed the authorities and I am now imprisoned for attempted adultery.”

Virginity tests in Afghanistan can happen if women flee their homes or enter public spaces without the supervision of men. Any legal authority, with or without the demand of the victim’s family, can order a virginity test to determine the presence of an intact hymen, even in the absence of substantial evidence that any sexual act has occurred. Tellingly, the examination focuses only on virginity, not on documenting the physical injuries of girls and women that occurred as result of GBV.

The World Health Organization has clearly stated that “such examinations have no scientific validity in determining virginity or sexual history. The use of such examinations for these purposes is a violation of international human right standards and principles.”

Life in the Morality Cells

The morality cells are excluded from the rest of the prison. The cells are stuffy; there are no windows, just brick walls. Inside, 16 bunk beds are attached to one another in four square rooms, leaving hardly any space to move around. Several women are carrying toddlers born out of wedlock. Many of the inmates are mothers who have either given birth while in the prison or brought their children to live with them after they were incarcerated.

Next to one of the rooms are two squatting toilets shared by over 30 women. This is where the women wash their clothes and bathe their children as well as themselves using a bucket provided. The toilets neither have doors nor windows. They run out of water frequently and always have excrement in them. The smell of sweat, dirt, dust, excrement, and body odor is unbearable. Occasionally there are screams and shouts, when a fight breaks out between the female inmates.

“There are men [male police and guards] everywhere in the prison. Our movement is restricted. We have to be inside and around our cells,” says Tahmeena. “The prisoners and staff don’t behave well. We fight amongst ourselves every day. We curse each other.”

“There is no good food. When it’s cold, we don’t have heating. Sometimes the staff beats us with iron rods. There is no health care. The head of the prison is the worst and beats us all the time,” she continues.

After finishing their prison sentences, women and their children are transferred to highly fortified secret shelters to protect them from honor-killings by their immediate family members until a more permanent and safer solution is worked out.

Thus Afghan girls and women are blamed for causing or provoking violence, especially when they are trying to escape it. In trying to defend themselves, they also end up confronting other injustices such as beatings, kidnappings, and threats of honor killing – a vicious circle which they find difficult to escape.

Justice System

None of the six women had much faith in the justice system. The authorities, including female lawyers and women-centered organizations, adopt a traditional attitude, with an inherent male bias, toward GBV survivors. Women are expected to follow the “morality framework” and remain subdued to maintain the status quo.

“I have no trust in the justice system. They [government and police officials] don’t want to work; they take bribes. If you know someone in the system, if you have the money, you can buy the law,” Tahmeena says.

“It’s easier for men. Men will sympathize with men.”

In the first six months of 2016, the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission reported 5,132 new cases of violence against women, including 241 murders, in the country. In almost all cases, the perpetrators act with impunity.

Similarly, innumerable cases have been recorded of authorized violence against women, such as public lashings and executions ordered by local ulemas and jirgas (informal community courts and local councils) attended and chaired by powerful male fundamentalists who defend religious decrees in all parts of Afghanistan. The Afghan parliament in the past has attempted to make stoning legal for actions that violate Sharia law, such as adultery.

The government has clearly failed to fully implement the 2009 Elimination of Violence Against Women (EVAW) law, landmark legislation that came into force in Afghanistan through a presidential decree to protect girls and women’s rights. The law criminalized 22 acts of violence against women and other harmful practices. It, however, received stiff opposition from parliamentarians and has been waiting for approval for eight years.

Challenging Misogyny and Fundamentalism: A Top-Down Approach

While female Afghan activists and women rights organizations have been persistent in advocating for women’s rights and providing specialized services to the victims of GBV, they face tremendous challenges, even threats to their lives. They operate within an Islamic framework to present their perspectives, which would otherwise be rejected or ignored. In recent years there have been a continuing series of attacks and assassinations of high-profile female politicians and women rights’ activists, to which the government has categorically turned a blind eye.

However, some women remain undeterred by the threats and oppositions. The women-led anti-fundamentalist organization Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan (RAWA), whose own founding member was assassinated by an Afghan fundamentalist group, still works underground in Afghanistan. They continue to face threats from fundamentalist groups and enormous challenges due to a lack of international funding and support.

RAWA argues that the U.S. government is compliant in promoting fundamentalist values and can be blamed for the current situation of women in Afghanistan. While the United States and the UN have the power to influence the Afghan government, they have failed to make women’s and girls’ rights their prime agenda. Women are hardly ever consulted on key decisions that would have an impact on their lives.

Women’s subordination has its roots in their exclusion from the high-level political agenda. The prioritization of male voices leaves little room to make gender-neutral and equitable policies, perpetuating a cycle of violence that we can’t seem to control from generation-to-generation.

The United States plays a significantly powerful role in the decision-making processes of Afghanistan and its political reconciliation, which can be utilized to persuade Afghan leaders to decriminalize moral offenses and promote women’s rights using a top-down approach. That would be the real deal for Afghan women.

Interview : Why Pakistan associates terrorism with Pashtuns and Afghans

• Author Shamil Shams

Pakistani officials have begun a "racial profiling" of the Pashtun people in the wake of a surge in terror attacks. In a DW interview, activist and researcher Saba Gul Khattak says the move is counterproductive.

Rights organizations in Pakistan have expressed concern over an "apparent racial profiling" and "stereotyping" of Pashtuns and Afghans as authorities step up their crackdown against Islamist militancy after a recent surge in terror attacks across the country.

The non-governmental Human Rights Commission of Pakistan recently condemned the harassment of Pashtuns by security officials.

Ties between Pakistan and Afghanistan have been tense as Islamabad claims that Afghan militants are perpetrating attacks inside the country. Many Pakistanis associate the militancy in their nation with the Pashtu-speaking people who live on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistani border.

In an interview with DW, Saba Gul Khattak, a renowned Pakistani researcher and activist, explains why the "ethnic profiling" of Pashtuns is a very dangerous trend for the country.

DW: Is the Pashtun "racial profiling" being carried out on a large scale in Pakistan, or are we witnessing some isolated incidents?

Saba Gul Khattak: The profiling is being carried out mainly in Punjab province - and to some extent in the capital Islamabad. This time round, it was spurred by the last month's suicide attacks in Lahore and Sehwan. However, similar trends have persisted for a while; the police in Punjab and Islamabad began ethnic profiling of Pashtuns in low-income areas prior to these attacks, and there were reports that the authorities blocked the national identity cards of Pashtuns settled in Punjab.

The profiling is restricted to a particular class - laborers/daily wage workers, hawkers, small shopkeepers and others who live in low-income communities. It is being carried out systematically as Punjab's government instructed police teams to identify a Pashtun at the community level to assist with identification processes.

According to "The Friday Times" newspaper, "Some district police officials distributed pamphlets requesting the general population to report any suspicious person or activity. The terrorists were specified as 'Pashtuns and Afghans.' Similarly, traders' organizations in Punjab have been asked to register Pashtuns working in their markets and submit lists to the nearby police stations to help the government curb terrorism."

In short, this is not the first time systematic surveys targeting Pashtuns have been conducted. In tandem with profiling is the decision of the Punjab government (and often the central government as well) not to allow internally displaced Pashtuns to enter the province.

Many people in Pakistan associate terrorism with the Pashtu-speaking Pakistanis and Afghans. What are the reasons behind this stereotyping?

This comes from the stereotype of a "gun-toting Pashtun" waging almost four decades of Afghan jihad (with the Mujahideen morphing into the Taliban). There is also the added dimension of the Pashtuns' religious conservatism on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistani border.

Furthermore, there is a historical context to the distrust of the Pashtuns due to the popularity of the "Khudai Khidmatgar" movement (affiliated with the Indian National Congress in opposition to the Muslim League - the party that demanded creation of Pakistan.) Soon after Pakistan's independence from British rule in 1947, the Khudai Khidmatgar workers and leaders were accused of being "traitors," their government was dismissed and their party offices and records were destroyed.

Afghanistan was also the last country to recognize Pakistan as a state because of the dubious legal status of the Durand Line that separates the two countries, and Kabul funded the Pashtunistan movement supporters. The Cold War further fuelled the Pashtunistan movement as Russia and Afghanistan were backing the nationalists in Pakistan's northwestern areas, creating deep-seated suspicion within the Pakistani establishment.

The post 9/11 war on terror introduced suicide bombings. The madrassas (Islamic seminaries) established across Pakistan, especially in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), came in handy. These madrassas further reinforced the association of terrorism with Pashtuns. The media carefully omitted mention of the Punjabi Taliban (present in Afghanistan and FATA since the late 1990s). Their presence was acknowledged by the government only around 2010 and 2011 when police stations in Punjab were being targeted and the provincial government needed Islamabad to allocate more funds for guarding police facilities.

Keeping in mind that the Pashtun-majority areas of the country have a long history of anti-Islamabad sentiment, as well as a "Pashtunistan" movement involving Afghanistan, how dangerous could this profiling be for the stability of the country?

The ethnic profiling will probably not bring the Pashtunistan movement back (Afghanistan's economy and political situation is far worse than Pakistan's hence there is little incentive to go for a greater Pashtunistan). However, alienating an entire ethnic group, questioning and blocking their citizenship due to some vague fears of terrorism, is counterproductive. It will deepen the resentment that has existed for some time. It strengthens the belief that only Pashtun blood is being shed on both sides of the border.

How is the repatriation of Afghan refugees and asylum seekers being viewed in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa? Is it also being looked at by some as the "victimization" of Pashtuns by Islamabad?

There are no simple answers to this question. Depending on the political party position, some Pakistani Pashtuns are in favor of Afghan refugees while others blame them for everything that is wrong in the province, especially the security situation. The poor Pashtuns in Pakistan have long resented the Afghan refugees with whom they have had to share their sparse resources and a deteriorating environment. The Afghans have resented being in Pakistan as they have had to work for lower wages whereas the Pakistani laborer has resented the Afghan labor as he felt robbed of his due share by Afghans who are willing to work for less money.

Politically speaking, there has been muted condemnation of forced ouster of refugees though Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif announced in the UN General Assembly in September 2016 that Pakistan would allow refugees to stay. However, harassment of refugees has continued as they are blamed for the deteriorating security situation.

How do you look at the current ties between Islamabad and Kabul? Are they likely to improve any time soon?

The ties between Pakistan and Afghanistan have deteriorated significantly since Afghan President Ashraf Ghani initially extended the hand of friendship to Islamabad. President Ghani's statements in the presence of Indian PM Narendra Modi about oppression in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan provinces and his refusal to accept Pakistan's aid offer of $500 million (465 million euros) indicate that relations are extremely tense. In Afghanistan, popular opinion holds the Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence security agency responsible for bomb attacks while in Pakistan, Afghan refugees are the convenient scapegoats.

TERRORIST MASJID-E-ZARRAR OF PAKISTAN AKA LAL MASJID INVITES PROSCRIBED ASWJ RINGLEADER

The management Lal Masjid aka Masjid-e-Zarrar in all over Pakistan due to its overt support to terrorism has invited Aurangzeb Farooqi, a ringleader of banned Deobandi terrorist outfit ASWJ (Sipah-e-Sahaba) to speak at a conference in Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan. The ASWJ (Sipah-e-Sahaba) is mother organisation of banned Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and together they are called mother of all terrorism in Pakistan.

Lal Masjid became notorious after its declared support to the terrorist attacks in all over Pakistan by Deobandi terrorists of banned outfits such as Taliban and its allies such as ASWJ/Lashkar-e-Jhangvi.
Abdul Aziz, Lal Masjid cleric is the host of the said programme which is to be held on Friday (tomorrow). He always defended takfiri Deobandi terrorist attacks in Pakistan. Farooqi is ringleader of ASWJ that was declared proscribed by the State of Pakistan because of its links to sectarian terrorism. Another guest speaker is Rafiq Afghan (who was wrongly named as Rafiq Awan in the poster), chief editor of Ummat, an Urdu daily who always projected the Taliban terrorists and published the sayings of Osama Bin Laden of al-Qaida and Mulla Omar of Taliban on its front page above the headline.
The management of Lal Masjid under its cleric Abdu Aziz is detested by law-abiding and pro-peace moderate Pakistanis. His war on social media activists and peaceful communities of Pakistan earned him a bad name.
But, Pakistanis are agape that proscribed sectarian terrorist outfit ringleaders are always welcomed in the capital city of Pakistan and there is no official at any level that implements the ban on the banned outfits and prevent the hatemongering pro-terrorism clerics such as Abdul Aziz and pro-terrorist newspaper owner Rafiq Afghan from hosting and speaking at the public meetings!

http://www.shiitenews.org/index.php/pakistan/item/27775-masjid-e-zarrar-of-pakistan-aka-lal-masjid-invites-proscribed-aswj-ringleader

Pakistan - A political census

By ZAHID HUSSAIN

How many are we? Finally, a count of the Pakistani population has started after a gap of 19 years. Perhaps more important than just the numbers game is the changing social landscape of the country that census 2017 is likely to reveal. This full population headcount will not only help map the profile of the nation it will also be critical to shaping its future. A likely shifting collage of a working-age, more educated and more urbanised population is bound to influence political dynamics in the country.

A national census, carried out periodically, is considered the largest and most reliable form of statistical data collection by governments. Empirical evidence thus provided helps drive the state policy on education, health and housing requirements. Unfortunately, this objective has not been a priority and has been persistently delayed in Pakistan. Following a 17-year gap between the 1981 and 1998 census is the even longer gap of 19 years before the 2017 census. In most other countries, including India and Bangladesh, the census takes place decennially.

Like many other national issues, the census has also become a politically contentious matter in this country causing repeated postponements. A full- scale household listing in 2011 had to be put aside and redone again now. And, it was the intervention of the Supreme Court that forced the authorities to fulfil this constitutional obligation.

Fearful of changing population dynamics that the census could validate, some political forces are trying to make the ongoing exercise even more controversial. It is highly unfortunate that an issue that should be unbiased and apolitical is being drawn into the country’s already fraught political battlefield. The last-minute court petition filed by the PPP and MQM to halt the census left a bad taste all around. Any objections should have been resolved before the start of this much-delayed population counting exercise. While the census may give a more realistic socioeconomic picture, it could also open a political Pandora’s box. It is evident that without census data one cannot have a clear understanding of the state of the economy and society. For political reform too, the country needs to have the latest population distribution data. Without this, the Election Commission cannot make plans for the delimitation of electoral constituencies and seat shares in parliament, nor can it deal with other issues required for strengthening a representative and inclusive democracy.

While some of the broad contours of Pakistan’s changing demography are already evident, it will be important to see how rapid population growth and a high rate of urbanisation may have impacted social, economic and political undercurrents. The last census conducted in 1998 showed the country’s population at 134 million — 100m were added since 1951. This phenomenal increase already signalled a population explosion getting completely out of control. Now, 19 years later, it is estimated to have grown to more than 200m, causing Pakistan to edge closer to the onerous position of the fifth most populous country.

Even more importantly, internal migration, rural mobility, and displaced populations due to internal conflict which will be manifest in the 2017 census count are very likely to alter the ethnic, social and economic landscape of different regions hence impacting the future political course. Because of these factors, this census is likely to reinforce the perception that the growth of population in all the four provinces and other regions is not even. It is apparent that the population has been growing much faster in some regions not necessarily because of high birth rates, but due to mobility from rural to urban areas.

Pakistan is one of the fastest urbanising countries in South Asia and some studies show that more than half the country’s population may be living in urban areas. Large-scale mobility of the rural population is the major factor behind urban growth. In the 1998 census, big towns with a population of one million and above accounted for 50 per cent of the total population. Now that share of urban population is projected to be at least 60pc.

According to one study, the urban areas account for around 80pc of the country’s GDP and almost all the country’s tax revenues. Urban poverty rates are almost one-half of rural poverty. Generally, the urbanisation rate may be much faster in Punjab, but internal migration and influx from the conflict areas in the northwest has caused a much greater increase of population in urban Sindh. For example, Karachi, which is the country’s main economic and financial hub, has witnessed an estimated increase of 8.8pc per annum in its population mainly because of the massive influx of migrants in recent years. The city’s population is projected to have more than doubled since 1998.

But the census will also raise questions about the shift in population ratios across the provinces. Does Punjab still enjoy a 54pc share in the country’s overall population? Similar questions arise in the case of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa which has witnessed the biggest migration of population forced by militant violence and successive military operations. The other highly sensitive issue is the likely change in the ethnic balance within the provinces particularly in the case of Sindh and Balochistan with the presence of significant migrant populations.

These changes in the demographic balance will also require a reallocation of seats in parliament and revisiting the NFC award. That may ignite a new political controversy among the provinces. Another contentious issue is that this radical demographic shift because of the rising urban population is not fully reflected in our existing political structure, as the representation of rural areas remains disproportionally high.

While the census may help in providing a more realistic socioeconomic picture of the country, it can also open a new political Pandora’s box. While a more populated Sindh may demand a greater share of resources and representation in parliament, the province is likely to face the same demand from its own urban centres. All these issues have to be tackled amicably for the further strengthening of our federal democratic system. The census is the necessary bitter pill to guide that change.

ﺑﻼﻭﻝ ﺑﮭﭩﻮ ﺯﺭﺩﺍﺭﯼ ﮐﺎ ﯾﻮﻡ ﭘﺎﮐﺴﺘﺎﻥ ﭘﺮ ﺗﻤﺎﻡ ﭘﺎﮐﺴﺘﺎﻧﯽ ﺷﮩﺮﯾﻮﮞ ﮐﻮ ﻣﺒﺎﺭﮐﺒﺎﺩ

ﭘﺎﮐﺴﺘﺎﻥ ﭘﯿﭙﻠﺰﭘﺎﺭﭨﯽ ﮐﮯ ﭼﯿﺌﺮﻣﯿﻦ ﺑﻼﻭﻝ ﺑﮭﭩﻮ ﺯﺭﺩﺍﺭﯼ ﻧﮯ ’’ ﯾﻮﻡ ﭘﺎﮐﺴﺘﺎﻥ ‘‘ ﭘﺮ ﺗﻤﺎﻡ ﭘﺎﮐﺴﺘﺎﻧﯽ ﺷﮩﺮﯾﻮﮞ ﮐﻮ ﻣﺒﺎﺭﮐﺒﺎﺩ ﺩﯼ ﮨﮯ، ﺍﭘﻨﮯ ﭘﯿﻐﺎﻡ ﻣﯿﮟ ﭘﺎﮐﺴﺘﺎﻥ ﭘﯿﭙﻠﺰﭘﺎﺭﭨﯽ ﮐﮯ ﭼﯿﺌﺮﻣﯿﻦ ﻧﮯ ﺯﻭﺭ ﺩﯾﺎ ﮐﮧ ﺍٓﺝ ﺳﮯ 8 ﺩﮨﺎﺋﯽ ﻗﺒﻞ ﻻﮨﻮﺭ ﻣﯿﮟ ﻣﻨﻈﻮﺭ ﮐﯽ ﮔﺌﯽ ’’ ﻗﺮﺍﺭﺩﺍﺩ ﭘﺎﮐﺴﺘﺎﻥ ‘‘ ﮐﮯ ﺣﻘﯿﻘﯽ ﺭﻭﺡ ﮐﮯ ﻣﻄﺎﺑﻖ ﺗﻤﺎﻡ ﻭﻓﺎﻗﯽ ﺍﮐﺎﺋﯿﻮﮞ ﮐﮯ ﻣﺎﺑﯿﻦ ﺭﺷﺘﻮﮞ ﮐﻮ ﻣﺰﯾﺪ ﻣﻀﺒﻮﻁ ﺑﻨﺎﯾﺎ ﺟﺎﺋﮯ، ﺍﻧﮩﻮﮞ ﻧﮯ ﮐﮩﺎ ﮐﮧ ﺑﺎﻧﯿﺎﻥ ﭘﺎﮐﺴﺘﺎﻥ ﮐﮯ ﺧﻮﺍﺑﻮﮞ ﮐﯽ ﺗﮑﻤﯿﻞ ﮐﺎ ﯾﮧ ﺳﻨﮩﺮﯼ ﻣﻮﻗﻊ ﮨﮯ ﺟﻨﮩﻮﮞ ﻧﮯ ﺍﻧﺼﺎﻑ ﺍﻣﻦ ﺍﻭﺭ ﻣﺴﺎﻭﺍﺕ ﭘﺮ ﻣﺒﻨﯽ ﺍﯾﮏ ﻣﺴﺎﻭﯼ ﺭﻭﻝ ﻣﺎﮈﻝ ﻣﺴﻠﻢ ﺭﯾﺎﺳﺖ ﮐﺎ ﺑﻨﯿﺎﺩ ﺭﮐﮭﺎ، ﺑﻼﻭﻝ ﺑﮭﭩﻮ ﺯﺭﺩﺍﺭﯼ ﻧﮯ ﯾﮧ ﻋﺰﻡ ﮐﯿﺎ ﮐﮧ ﺑﺎﻧﯿﺎﻥ ﭘﺎﮐﺴﺘﺎﻥ ﮐﮯ ﻣﺸﻦ ﺍﻭﺭ ﻧﻈﺮﯾﮧ ﭘﺎﮐﺴﺘﺎﻥ ﮐﯽ ﺣﻘﯿﻘﯽ ﻣﺸﻌﻞ ﺑﺮﺩﺍﺭ ﮐﮯ ﻃﻮﺭ ﭘﺎﮐﺴﺘﺎﻥ ﭘﯿﭙﻠﺰﭘﺎﺭﭨﯽ ﭘﯿﭽﮭﮯ ﮨﭩﮯ ﺑﻐﯿﺮ ﺍﭘﻨﮯ ﻣﺸﻦ ﺍﻭﺭ ﻣﻘﺼﺪ ﮐﯽ ﺣﺎﺻﻼﺕ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ ﺍﭘﻨﺎ ﺳﻔﺮ ﺟﺎﺭﯼ ﺭﮐﮭﮯ ﮔﯽ، ﺑﻼﻭﻝ ﺑﮭﭩﻮ ﺯﺭﺩﺍﺭﯼ ﻧﮯ ﮐﮩﺎ ﮐﮧ ﯾﮧ ﺗﺎﺭﯾﺨﯽ ﺩﻥ ﻣﻨﺎﺗﮯ ﮨﻮﺋﮯ ﮨﻤﯿﮟ ﭼﺎﮨﯿﮯ ﮐﮧ ﺩﻧﯿﺎ ﮐﮯ ﻧﻘﺸﮧ ﭘﺮ ﺍﯾﮏ ﺭﻭﻝ ﻣﺎﮈﻝ ﻣﺴﻠﻢ ﻣﻠﮏ ﮐﺎ ﺩﺭﺟﮧ ﺣﺎﺻﻞ ﮐﺮﻧﮯ ﮐﮯ ﻟﯿﮯ ﺍﭘﻨﯽ ﺗﻤﺎﻡ ﺻﻼﺣﯿﺘﯿﮟ ﺍﻭﺭ ﻗﺎﺑﻠﯿﺘﯿﮟ ﺑﺮﻭﺋﮯ ﮐﺎﺭ ﻻﺋﯿﮟ۔

https://ppppunjab.wordpress.com/2017/03/23/%EF%BA%91%EF%BB%BC%EF%BB%AD%EF%BB%9D-%EF%BA%91%EF%AE%AD%EF%AD%A9%EF%BB%AE-%EF%BA%AF%EF%BA%AD%EF%BA%A9%EF%BA%8D%EF%BA%AD%EF%AF%BC-%EF%AE%90%EF%BA%8E-%EF%AF%BE%EF%BB%AE%EF%BB%A1-%EF%AD%98%EF%BA%8E/

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