UMAIR JAVED
THE victory of Masroor Haq Nawaz Jhangvi in last Thursday’s by-election is cause for considerable concern. A few observers disagree with this alarmism, and suggest the success of the Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat, the Muttahida Deeni Mahaz, or any of its related incarnations, is based on their responsiveness to local service delivery concerns. We are told they are able to deliver mundane public goods such as access to policing, justice, sanitation, and paved streets better than other local elites. Hence, the time-tested axiom of ‘all politics is local’ explains why urban voters in Jhang have been consistently voting for Sunni extremists since the mid-1980s.
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| PUNJAB'S LAW MINISTER SANAULLAH(ON LEFT) SUPPORTS HARDLINE FANATICS FROM JHANG. |
While patronage politics may be part of the story, it fails to account for the entire picture, especially in instances where opposing candidates are also capable of delivering patronage.
In many parts of the world, and through much of history, the appeal of hard-right or extremist parties is based precisely on fusing ideological messaging with material gains. The closest example of this is the Sangh Parivar in India, which has used the private provision of social services and local charity efforts as part of its Hindutva proselytising mission. Further back in history, we see this happening with the Nazi party in Germany, which was using local community service organisations and voluntary associations to popularise itself before it took over the state. To reduce the Jhangvis and Ludhianvis to thana-kutcheri politics is exactly what they would want, and exactly what would blind us to the real danger their political presence poses.
Others counter the alarmism by suggesting that Thursday’s result is just another political blight in a uniquely sectarian city. They argue, and perhaps not unfairly, that the success of a rabid extremist in Jhang is unlikely to be replicated in the rest of the country. There is some historical truth to this assertion. Anti-Shia rhetoric has failed to capture voters’ imagination in other parts of the country as it has in Jhang. While casual, everyday anti-Shia bigotry is frequently seen amongst many urban and rural citizens, it has failed to manifest itself in direct political behaviour.
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| PAKISTAN'S INTERIOR MINISTER CH NISAR PROTECTS PUNJABI TALIBAN. |
Quite a few people seem willing to shrug off Jhangvi’s victory as the fair outcome of our democratic process.
Nonetheless, the electoral failure of hard-line Sunni supremacists in other parts of the country should not mask the real gains made over the past couple of decades.
During the peak period of anti-Shia violence in Punjab, the Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) won one MNA and two MPA seats in the 1993 election. One of its MPAs was also made an adviser to the then chief minister, Mian Manzoor Wattoo.
Going into the 2018 election, the latest incarnation of the SSP is close to matching its performance from 23 years ago. It now has one MPA elected, and another strong MNA candidate — Ludhianvi — already cleared for participation in mainstream politics by the Lahore High Court.
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| PAKISTANI PM NAWAZ SHARIF SUPPORTS PUNJABI TALIBAN. |
The 2013 election and subsequent local council polls also point to small pockets of electoral support for sectarian forces outside Jhang. In the last general election, 120 MNA candidates on the Muttahida Deeni Mahaz (MDM) ticket secured approximately 350,000 votes countrywide. This is undoubtedly a small number both overall and per candidate, especially compared to the millions raked in by the mainstream parties.
However, there were 20-odd seats where MDM candidates secured more than 10,000 votes, and amongst those, five where they were within touching distance of the winner. Subsequently, in the 2015 local government elections, these very forces captured a few local council seats in rural Punjab and Karachi, and had an improved showing in different parts of urban Sindh.
None of this signifies an imminent apocalypse, but it does highlight organisational depth and geographic reach. Putting up 120 candidates and contesting polls means the existence of some political infrastructure and the ability to generate some contact with voters.
In the run-up to the Jhang by-election, videos of the candidate and his supporters engaging in anti-Shia speeches could be easily found on the internet. Such speeches will likely be replicated (and this is already happening) by their other candidates elsewhere in the country. It may not be enough to deliver a critical amount of votes, but it is enough to further sow sectarian bigotry and hatred amongst the population.
Lastly, quite a few people seem willing to shrug off Jhangvi’s victory as the fair outcome of our democratic process. This is only true if one buys into the crass conception of majoritarian rule that many in this country equate with democracy. The final aim of a political system should not be a no-holds barred popularity contest, but a system where social democratic norms limit majoritarian excesses. This should take the shape of safeguards for smaller communities, and zero tolerance for hate speech and violence.
The PML-N, which has a history of using local alliances with extremists for its own gain, and all other mainstream parties currently in charge face a clear option. Either they ignore the sectarian problem till its expanding presence shifts the entire edifice of electoral politics even further to the right, or they work harder to prosecute hate-mongering candidates to cleanse the political system of their presence. Given how violent this past decade has been, it is high time that political elites agree that even one rabid extremist in any legislative assembly is one too many.
